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ABSTRACT
As one of the most critical components of the Internet, the Domain Name System (DNS)
provides naming services for Internet users, who rely on DNS to perform the translation
between the domain names and network entities before establishing an Internet
connection. In this dissertation, we present our studies on di↵erent aspects of the
naming infrastructure in today’s Internet, including DNS itself and the network services
based on the naming infrastructure such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs).
We first characterize the evolution and features of the DNS resolution in web services
under the emergence of third-party hosting services and cloud platforms. At the bottom
level of the DNS hierarchy, the authoritative DNS servers (ADNSes) maintain the actual
mapping records and answer the DNS queries. The increasing use of upstream ADNS
services (i.e., third-party ADNS-hosting services) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
clouds facilitates the deployment of web services, and has been fostering the evolution of
the deployment of ADNS servers. To shed light on this trend, we conduct a large-scale
measurement to investigate the ADNS deployment patterns of modern web services and
examine the characteristics of di↵erent deployment styles, such as performance, life-cycle
of servers, and availability. Furthermore, we specifically focus on the DNS deployment
for subdomains hosted in IaaS clouds.
Then, we examine a pervasive misuse of DNS names and explore a straightforward
solution to mitigate the performance penalty in DNS cache. DNS cache plays a critical
role in domain name resolution, providing (1) high scalability at Root and
Top-level-domain nameservers with reduced workloads and (2) low response latency to
clients when the resource records of the queried domains are cached. However, the
pervasive misuses of domain names, e.g., the domain names of “one-time-use” pattern,
have negative impact on the e↵ectiveness of DNS caching as the cache has been filled
with those entries that are highly unlikely to be retrieved. By leveraging the domain
name based features that are explicitly available from a domain name itself, we propose
simple policies for improving DNS cache performance and validate their e cacy using
real traces.
Finally, we investigate the security implications of a fundamental vulnerability in
DNS-based CDNs. The success of CDNs relies on the mapping system that leverages the
dynamically generated DNS records to distribute a client’s request to a proximal server
for achieving optimal content delivery. However, the mapping system is vulnerable to
malicious hijacks, as it is very di cult to provide pre-computed DNSSEC signatures for
dynamically generated records in CDNs. We illustrate that an adversary can deliberately
tamper with the resolvers to hijack CDN’s redirection by injecting crafted but legitimate
mappings between end-users and edge servers, while remaining undetectable by existing
security practices, which can cause serious threats that nullify the benefits o↵ered by
CDNs, such as proximal access, load balancing, and DoS protection. We further
demonstrate that DNSSEC is ine↵ective to address this problem, even with the newly
adopted ECDSA that is capable of achieving live signing for dynamically generated DNS
records. We then discuss countermeasures against this redirection hijacking.
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On the Impact of Internet Naming Evolution: Deployment,
Performance, and Security Implications
2Chapter 1
Introduction
Accessing Internet services relies on the naming infrastructure, i.e., the Domain Name
System (DNS), for translating human-readable domain names to routable network ad-
dresses. DNS is designed as a globally distributed database system, where the Root and
Top-Level-Domain (TLD) nameservers are mainly used as the querying referrals, and
the authoritative DNS servers (ADNSes) are responsible for storing the name-to-address
records and returning answers to clients. Meanwhile, the acquired mapping results are
cached by local DNS servers (LDNSes) to answer the following queries in a specific dura-
tion. The first two studies presented in this dissertation involve with DNS itself. In the
first work, we present a large-scale measurement study to understand the DNS deployment
for web services. Then, in the second work, we explore the simple policies to improve the
e↵ectiveness of DNS caching by considering the prevalent non-malicious misuse of domain
names on the Internet.
Many Internet services have relied on DNS to achieve their enhanced functionalities.
The most common example is the Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). CDNs play an
important role in the Internet ecosystem by delivering a large fraction of the Internet
content to end users with high availability, performance, and scalability. Typically, CDNs
place a large number of edge servers at geographically distributed edge networks, enabling
content caching and proximal access for end-users. The user requests for the content
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hosted by CDNs are served at the “edge” via request redirection to improve user-perceived
performance and balance the load across server clusters. Moreover, CDNs are able to
provide a security portal of protection mechanism against distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks by redirecting users from overwhelmed nodes [29, 123]. The third study
in this dissertation aims to investigate a fundamental vulnerability that could be exploited
by adversaries in a very stealthy manner to manipulate the access of end-users for CDNs
and nullify the benefits o↵ered by CDN vendors. We characterize popular CDN venders
on the vulnerability and discuss countermeasures against such a security threat.
In sub-sections 1.1 - 1.3, we briefly introduce the motivation and problem statement
of each study. In sub-section 1.4, we describe the organization of this dissertation.
1.1 Measuring and Characterizing the DNS deployment of
Modern Web Services
Deploying authoritative nameservers requires extra hardware resources and additional
maintenance support. Also, the critical roles of DNS services in web infrastructures make
DNS an attractive target to attackers. Thus, web service providers are increasingly adopt-
ing the upstream authoritative DNS servers, including the top sites (e.g., Amazon and
Twitter) that have the ability to maintain their own ADNS infrastructures. In addition,
to save a large amount of investments for computing infrastructures, many popular web
services are directly built upon Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds such as Amazon
EC2 and Windows Azure. The traditional web service providers are also migrating ex-
tended services into clouds to use the “illusively infinite” computing and storage resources.
The IaaS infrastructure greatly facilitates the establishment of modern web services and
also promotes the process of delegating the authoritative name resolution to third-party
ADNS service providers. Besides traditional web-hosting providers such as Dyn [16] and
Ultradns [35], the CDN and cloud service providers also o↵er the ADNS services that
integrate the name resolution into their CDNs or cloud infrastructures [1, 5].
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The existing DNS measurements focus on the characteristics of DNS activities and
operations [50, 34, 61, 26, 65] at the root or top-level-domain servers [48, 51, 88, 90, 126],
as well as the DNS resolvers [19, 36, 107]. Some works involving with the characteristics
of ADNSes mainly center on the comparison with local DNS (LDNS) servers, but none of
them explore various ADNS deployments for web services. Complementary to these prior
works, we present a large-scale measurement study in attempt to answer the following
questions: (1) how do modern web services deploy their ADNS servers? (2) what are the
characteristics of di↵erent ADNS deployment patterns? and (3) in particular, how do the
cloud-hosting subdomains administer their ADNS servers?
1.2 Exploring Domain Name Based Features on the E↵ec-
tiveness of DNS Caching
Since DNS is a globally distributed database system, caching has been widely adopted in
DNS infrastructures, where the acquired mapping results (i.e., DNS resource records, RRs)
will be cached locally to answer the following queries in a specific duration. DNS cache
significantly reduces the resolution tra c along referral chains to interact with multiple
name servers, resulting in much shortened client-perceived delay and high scalability of
DNS.
Due to its fundamental role for accessing Internet services, DNS tra c is the least
blocked [103], and provides both attackers and developers with an attractive channel
to transmit information. Thus, the misuse of domain names (either malicious or non-
malicious) is widely observed on the Internet. On the other hand, since the cached objects
in DNS resolvers are typically small, in some instances the caches are not size limited [79]
and the memory usage is relatively stable as the expired entries are being evicted. However,
when serving a large group of users with heavy workload (e.g., in ISP or CDN/cloud
providers), although modern DNS resolvers manage the memory well, the cache will still
quickly consume the memory bytes and go into swap. Meanwhile, this may also cause
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performance problems on CPU if cleaning-interval is enabled to check the stale records
periodically. To this e↵ect, a fixed memory allocation is a common configuration [54] and
the typical replacement policies (e.g., LRU and LFU) are employed to manage the cache
usage [56, 64]. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that the cached RRs would be quite likely
to be accessed again. Unfortunately, the pervasiveness of misused domains, e.g., disposable
domains [54], has caused the ine↵ectiveness of caching on resolvers since the cache is filled
up by the records with very low or almost zero cache hit rates.
In this work, we attempt to mitigate the negative e↵ect on DNS caching caused by
the domain name misuses, especially the “one-time-use” domains. Di↵erent from previous
approaches, we do not pursue an accurate detection of domain misuses by employing
the deep inspection techniques such as behavioral features [47], alphanumeric characters-
based metric [106], or entropy-based computing [103]. Instead, our key insight is that
most misused domains, either malicious or benign, tend to transmit information over
DNS query names. Thus, the domain name itself may have distinct features that are
explicitly available from individual queries and can be readily exploited for improving
DNS cache performance. By extracting the re-used and once-used RRs from our trace
logs captured at the campus networks of two universities, we propose and validate the
explicit domain name-based features that could be used to improve the e↵ectiveness of
DNS caches by proactively eliminating the domains that are highly unlikely to be reused
in future’s queries.
1.3 End Users Get Maneuvered: Redirection Hijacking in
Content Delivery Networks
CDNs place a large number of edge servers (also called surrogates) at geographically
distributed edge networks, enabling content caching and proximal access for end-users.
Thus, how to redirection or route client requests among edge server clusters is a central
function of CDNs and its design choice is critical to CDNs. The majority of today’s
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CDNs leverage the Domain Name System (DNS) as the core of their mapping systems
to redirect a client’s request into a nearby edge server. Since a DNS-based mapping
system is based on real-time measurements of server and network conditions, it can provide
fast, accurate, and fine-grained control for request redirection. Thus, its usage has been
dominant in leading CDN vendors for operating a large number of edge servers, such as
Akamai. However, such a DNS-based mapping system requires DNS records to be very
dynamic, which restrains those DNS-based CDNs from authenticating their mapping DNS
records by using DNSSEC signatures. This is because DNSSEC was originally designed
for static records. Due to its prohibitively high computational overhead, traditional RSA-
based DNSSEC is not a feasible solution to secure dynamic DNS records in the context
of CDNs.
In this study, we investigate the security implication in the DNS-based mapping sys-
tem of CDNs, which can be exploited by adversaries to hijack the operation of request
redirection in a very stealthy manner and then nullify the benefits provided by CDNs, such
as proximal access to nearby edge servers, geographically load-balancing, and DoS pro-
tection. To perform the redirection hijacking, the adversaries deliberately maneuver the
mapping between end-users and edge servers by injecting fraudulent DNS records. Wor-
risomely, even the newly adopted Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
that is capable of providing real-time DNSSEC signatures is ine↵ective to detect and pre-
vent malicious DNS record injection. We reveal that an adversary can utilize a legitimate
mapping record to override CDN’s cluster/server selection and redirect a certain group of
users to an edge server chosen by the adversary.
1.4 Roadmap
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we present
a large-scale measurement study to profile the characterizations of authoritative DNS
(ADNS) servers for modern web services and cloud-hosting subdomains. In Chapter 3, we
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propose the domain name based features that are explicitly available from domain name
itself to mitigate the performance penalty caused by the prevalent usage of “disposable
domains” (i.e., one-time-used names) on the Internet by prematurely excluding the do-
mains that are highly unlikely to be used from DNS cache. In Chapter 4, we investigate
a fundamental vulnerability of CDNs, called redirection hijacking, which stems from the
dynamic characteristics of DNS records used for the CDN’s request routing, and could be
exploited by adversaries for degrading CDN’s performance and nullifying the benefits pro-
vided by CDN’s such as load balancing and DoS protections. We summarize the studies
in this dissertation and discuss future work in Chapter 5.
8Chapter 2
Measuring and Characterizing the
DNS Deployment of Modern Web
Services
As a hierarchical distributed database system, the Domain Name System (DNS) is one
of the most important components of Internet infrastructure, providing the mapping be-
tween the domain names and network-level addresses to direct clients to specific Internet
services. In DNS hierarchy, the authoritative DNS (ADNS) servers are administered by
the service providers and responsible for storing the name-to-address records and return-
ing answers to the clients. Due to the requirements of extra hardware resources and
additional maintenance support, the web service providers are increasingly adopting the
upstream authoritative DNS servers. Also, many of today’s popular web services are built
upon Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds. In this study, we explore state-of-the-art
of the patterns of ADNS deployment and perform a large-scale measurement study to
demonstrate the characteristics of di↵erent patterns.
In doing so, we first collect the authoritative DNS server information for top-ranking
websites on Alexa’s list [3] and eliminate the redundant domain records. This constructs
our dataset with about 2.3 million nameservers for about 0.94 million websites. We then
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develop a systematic method to explore ADNS server deployment patterns and perform
the geo-distributed probing experiments. In particular, by directly issuing DNS queries
to each ADNS server, we examine their deployment details and characteristics. Next,
we focus on the DNS deployment of web services whose subdomains are hosted in cloud
infrastructure. We extract the subdomain list from an existing dataset [8], reproduce the
ADNS servers of subdomains for comparing with the original results, and examine their
deployment.
We summarize our major findings and contributions as follows:
• We use a simple heuristic method to determine the ADNS deployment patterns. In
fact, it is fairly easy to recognize the pattern for an individual website from its NS
records, but it is much more di cult when looking for millions of websites in such a
large-scale study.
• We validate the use of ADNS proxy infrastructure by examining the transition delay
and the TTL aging.
• We first quantify the usage and profile the characteristics of ADNS servers in terms
of the deployment patterns.
• We find that most top-ranked websites deploy their own DNS servers but emerging
popular social sites tend to use the upstream DNS-hosting services. We also observe
few servers being used in private deployment.
• We find that the ADNS deployment patterns remain stable. The change of private
servers is more frequent than that of upstream servers. The websites using upstream
services change frequently their hosting domains but have the lowest frequency to
change their deployment patterns.
• Among the studied patterns (i.e., private, upstream, and hybrid), we observe that
upstream achieves the highest performance while hybrid has the highest availability.
CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERIZING DNS OF WEB SERVICES 10
• We quantify the usage of ADNSes for cloud-hosting subdomains. We observe a
noticeable growth on the usage of cloud-providing DNS service.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the background
of DNS and ADNS deployment in §2.1. We describe the data sets used in the study
and our analysis methods in §2.2. We present the measurement results and analysis of
ADNS deployment for top-ranking websites in §2.3. We profile the usage of ADNSes for
cloud-hosting subdomains in §2.4. We survey related work in §2.5, and finally conclude
the chapter in §2.6.
2.1 Background
In this section, we give an overview of DNS and present the authoritative DNS deployment
patterns for modern web services. In addition, we specially discuss the DNS deployment
of cloud-hosting subdomains.
2.1.1 DNS Overview
Figure 2.1 shows the DNS components and the process of name resolution. A resolution
routine on the client-end host, called stub resolver, issues a DNS lookup to a recursive
resolver, a local DNS server (LDNS) deployed by the client’s local network or a public
DNS service [21, 28] located in a wide area network. Without considering the cache e↵ects
on the resolvers and intermediate servers, the recursive resolver will first contact the root
server. The root server directs the resolver to query a top-level-domain (TLD) server (e.g.,
the .com TLD server). Similarly, the TLD server responds the resolver’s query with the
address of the authoritative DNS server (ADNS) for the corresponding domain. Next, the
local recursive resolver queries the ADNS server for the address of the domain host, and
finally the client can reach the Internet service as the recursive resolver returns the answer
for name resolution.
CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERIZING DNS OF WEB SERVICES 11
     Internet
1
2 3
45
6
Local Network
Local/Public 
Resolver
Client 
Resolver
Root Server Top-Level 
Domain Server
Authoritative 
DNS Server
Web Server
Figure 2.1: DNS Resolution Process (Iterative query).
2.1.2 ADNS Deployment Patterns
Figure 2.2 illustrates the steps of a client accessing the web services under three di↵erent
ADNS deployments:
• Private ADNS server: The web service owners deploy their private authoritative
DNS servers only within their own domains.1
• Upstream ADNS server: The web service owners delegate their authoritative
name resolution to the upstream DNS-hosting service providers.2
• Hybrid ADNS deployment: The web service owners employ both the private
DNS servers and the upstream ADNS servers for their authoritative name resolution.
Table 2.1 lists the domains hosting authoritative DNS servers for the top 15 websites on
Alexa’s list [3]. Most of these top websites host the ADNS servers within their own domains
1The domains hosting web services and private nameservers may also be located inside IaaS clouds. In
such a case, the service provider runs the ADNS servers with cloud instances.
2We only consider the ADNS-hosting domains to identify the deployment, regardless of whether a
website itself is hosted in private infrastructure or web-hosting companies.
3The ranking is from April 2015.
4The TLDs of Ultradns serving for amazon.com include .net, .org, .info, and .co.uk. Although
Amazon o↵ers a public DNS-hosting service (Route 53 [5]) for its cloud tenants, it delegates its DNS
resolution to upstream providers. We infer that it is a historical reason: Amazon has been running the
upstream ADNS for amazon.com since its establishment in 1995 and did not switch to private servers when
expanding its business to cloud services.
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Figure 2.2: ADNS Deployment for Web Services.
since they are capable of maintaining a secure and reliable DNS infrastructure. However,
amazon.com and twitter.com delegate their name resolution services to upstream ADNS
providers, for which amazon.com uses two di↵erent vendors. Linkedin.com hosts ADNS
servers in both its own domain and the upstream provider. Note that many top websites
enable their primary ADNS servers to resolve the names for other domains they possess,
such as Google for youtube.com, Microsoft for live.com, and Sina for weibo.com.
Use of DNS Proxy. To validate DNS tra c and protect the ADNS servers, the ser-
vice owners may deploy the DNS proxy servers to control incoming5 DNS queries and
enable flexible management. Figure 2.3 shows the DNS proxy deployment for private
and upstream ADNS servers. In both scenarios, the clients first contact the DNS proxy
servers, and then the proxy servers transparently relay the queries to ADNS servers and
5The DNS proxy can also be used to control the outgoing DNS tra c in local networks. In addition, a
specified re-routing service, called Smart DNS proxy, directs the users to access region-restricted or blocked
content. In our study, we only consider the DNS proxy that serves for incoming connections of ADNS
servers.
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Table 2.1: ADNS Deployment of Top 15 Sites3
Domain ADNS
google.com google.com
facebook.com facebook.com
youtube.com google.com
yahoo.com yahoo.com
baidu.com baidu.com
wikipedia.org wikimedia.org
amazon.com dynect.net, ultradns4
twitter.com dynect.net
taobao.com taobao.com
qq.com qq.com
google.co.in google.com
live.com msft.net
sina.com.cn sina.com.cn
linkedin.com dynect.net, linkedin.com
weibo.com sina.com.cn
return the answers back to clients. To date the DNS proxy servers have been developed as
functionality-rich systems, such as Global Tra c Manager (GTM) [20] or Global Server
Load Balancing (GSLB) [27], to optimize access performance and secure DNS servers. All
these environments are recognized as the DNS proxy infrastructure in our study.
DNS for Cloud-hosting Subdomains. Figure 2.4 shows the steps for accessing the
(partly) cloud-hosting subdomains. These subdomains are the partial sections of primary
websites, hosted inside a cloud for achieving scalable infrastructure and providing extended
services. The primary ADNS servers, deployed by either private servers or upstream
services, could be used to direct users to the cloud subdomain, as shown in Figure 4(a).
Also, some providers delegate the name resolution for cloud subdomains to a dedicated
subdomain DNS server, as shown in Figure 4(b). The delegated DNS server could be
deployed by (1) DNS software running within cloud instances, (2) DNS resolution service
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o↵ered by the cloud provider, or (3) the third-party upstream services. We examine the
DNS deployment details for such cloud-hosting subdomains in §5.
2.2 Datasets and Methodology
This section introduces the datasets used in the study and presents our approaches to
examine the deployment patterns of ADNS servers.
2.2.1 Datasets
Alexa’s list [3] of the top 1-million websites is updated daily and based on the one-month
average tra c. The list used in our study was downloaded in June 2014.
2.2.1.1 Authoritative DNS server dataset
We collected the authoritative DNS server information for the top 1-million websites
on Alexa’s list through dig utility. Since the personal pages from several popular web
services are individually included in Alexa’s list and their hosting domains have been
ranked, we eliminated those page links from our data with (1) a slash “/” after do-
main names, which typically indicates the sub-webpages, such as YouTube’s user home
pages youtube.com/[user ], and (2) the domains having the lower-level names before the
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Figure 2.4: DNS Deployment for (Partly) Cloud-hosting Subdomains.
second-level names6, such as Blogspot’s personal blog pages [user ].blogspot.com. Fi-
nally, we collected the authoritative DNS information for 942,467 websites with 2,339,345
domain servers, consisting of 352,022 distinct nameservers.
Upon the dataset, we study the characteristics, such as performance and availability,
of di↵erent ADNS deployment patterns by probing the collected servers. To eliminate the
cache e↵ect at intermediate servers, we issue the DNS queries to designated ADNS servers
by using the @global-server option of dig utility.
6They are identified by publicsuffix[32], a parser implemented by recognizing the domain su xes
from the Public Su x List [31].
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2.2.1.2 Cloud-hosting subdomain list
The list of cloud-hosting subdomains is extracted from a prior dataset [8], which includes
the subdomains associated with Alexa’s list and hosted in Amazon EC2 and Windows
Azure. We reproduced the DNS server list since we found that a large number of DNS
records have been changed. We also found many subdomains had been migrated to other
cloud providers, but their DNS information could still be used for our study.
2.2.2 Determining ADNS Deployment Patterns
We first construct the list of authoritative DNS servers of each web domain by extracting
NS records from the responses of dig probes, and then attempt to determine the ADNS
deployment pattern. However, without a complete list of global upstream DNS providers
to identify all DNS-hosting domains, it is impossible to have an automated method to
accurately determine the pattern for every site. To ensure our study’s e↵ectiveness and
accuracy, we design a heuristic method to capture as many websites as possible for each
pattern by discarding the records likely to be miscategorized:
Step 1: First we extract the second-level name from each domain (e.g., google from
google.com), and perform a substring search for that name in its every name-
server’s hostname. Here we exclude the domains with one or two characters of
second-level names since they may coincidently match the hostnames (e.g., the
second-level name “t” from t.co matches the servers at dynect.net). We then
move these domains into a short-name list to be determined later (Step 5).
Step 2: For each domain, we assign two variables, tm and tn, to record the number of
matching and non-matching occurrences, respectively.
• If a certain server contributes tm, we consider that it serves as a private
nameserver located in the same or related domain with its web service. We
collect those servers in a private list.
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• For the servers without matching occurrence, we put them to an upstream
list.
• For a domain with tm > 0 and tn = 0, we consider all its ADNS servers to
be located in a related domain hosting its web service, and thus we refer to
the domain as the private ADNS deployment.
For example, four nameservers ns[1-4].google.com serve for google.com. The second-
level name google matches for all nameservers, which gives tm = 4 and tn = 0. Also,
upon the general naming customs, this matching process has been able to recognize many
domains that deploy private ADNS servers in separated and dedicated domains (e.g.,
ebay.com deploys its DNS servers in ebaydns.com).
However, some separated DNS-hosting domains cannot be identified from the sim-
ple substring search in this step (e.g., as shown in Table 1, the nameservers hosted in
sina.com.cn serve for weibo.com).
Step 3: Our basic idea, to recognize such deployment, is to determine the deployment
patterns of websites by the categories of their nameservers. Therefore, we would
filter the private and upstream list (in this and the next step, respectively) to
exclude the nameservers that might be miscategorized.
Despite the successful matching in step 1, the private list still includes some servers
used as upstream services. For example, the nameserver ns1.dnsmadeeasy.com matches
the domain dnsmadeeasy.com, and thus is recognized as a private DNS server. However,
it also serves as an ADNS-hosting server for thousands of other websites.7 Since the
nameservers will be used to determine deployment patterns, we would eliminate such
records from the private list.
In doing so, we first extract the domain part of each ADNS server by using the
publicsuffix [32] parser (e.g., getting the domain part bbc.co.uk from the nameserver
7In our study, the pattern of servers is determined by their specific role for an individual website. That
is, in this example, ns1.dnsmadeeasy.com is a private DNS server for dnsmadeeasy.com, but an upstream
server for other domains using its DNS-hosting service.
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Figure 2.5: CDF for the number of domains supported by individual DNS server under
matching occurrence (Note that the Y axis starts from 0.6 ).
ns1.tcams.bbc.co.uk). We then calculate the number of domains that each extracted
domain part serves for, except for the domains with matching occurrences. For exam-
ple, the ADNS servers in ebaydns.com support 64 domains in the dataset, 49 of which
match the hostnames of servers (i.e., the second-level name ebay matches the domain
ebaydns.com). This indicates the ADNS servers in ebaydns.com serve for 15 domains
without matching occurrences. On the other hand, we find 8,487 domains supported by
the servers located inside dnsmadeeasy.com.
The heuristic to filter the private list is from a general observation: the number of
domains served by private DNS servers would be less than the number of domains supported
by the third-party upstream servers. Since what we want is to have a private server list
with accurate classification, simply discarding the servers with a certain number of served
domains will be enough for our study.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the cumulative distribution for the number of domains served
by nameservers with matching occurrences. Not surprisingly, most of servers only support
a few domains: about 96.7% of DNS-hosting domains serve for fewer than 20 web domains.
We believe that it is safe to discard the servers administrating more than 20 domains in
the private list, since (1) the matching process has excluded the majority of upstream
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servers, (2) most upstream service providers should have more than 20 served websites
in such a large-scale dataset, and (3) while several errors exist, they would not have a
significant e↵ect on our study because the number of miscategorized websites is marginal
(< 20⇥ the number of errors).
To inspect the accuracy of our heuristic method, we extract and examine the results
for the top 100 most popular websites. We find that the nameservers from three private
domains (google.com, facebook.com, and msft.net) are removed from the private list
since they serve for more than 20 domains. We argue that it also does not a↵ect our study
because (1) the ADNS deployment patterns of their primary websites have been identified
as private due to the matching occurrence in step 2, and (2) only a small portion of the
domains served by these private nameservers in the three domains above are discarded
but most of them have the same ADNS deployment as their primary sites.8
According to the filtered private list, if any server in the upstream list also appears in
the private list, we consider that it is deployed as a private server for the corresponding
domain. We then move this server into the private list.
Step 4: We extract all domain parts from the servers in the upstream list and calculate
how many websites those DNS-hosting domains support. For similar considera-
tions with step 3, we discard the servers with fewer than 20 administrated domains
since they could be private servers. We also will not move them to the private
list because without any matching occurrence, we cannot ensure that they are
private servers.
Step 5: We then update tm and tn for each unidentified domain (i.e., a domain not labeled
in step 2 and in the short-name list) by examining its nameservers:
• if one nameserver appears in the private list, increase tm by one;
• if one nameserver appears in the upstream list, increase tn by one.
8The nameservers of these sites are moved back to the private list in the following steps.
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We finally determine the ADNS pattern as follows:
• tm > 0 and tn = 0: private ADNS
• tm = 0 and tn > 0: upstream ADNS
• tm > 0 and tn > 0: hybrid ADNS
As an example, we find six nameservers for hao123.com, a website-directory service
provided by baidu.com. One nameserver is located in hao123.com and the other five are
in baidu.com. Thereby, the matching step gives tm = 1 and tn = 5. In addition, the five
nameservers hosted in baidu.com appear in the private list since they are also serving
baidu.com. Finally, we have tm = 6 and tn = 0, and refer to this site as a private ADNS
deployment.
We eliminate the domains whose nameservers cannot be identified by the private
or upstream lists. Finally, we discard 19,956 (2.1%) records from the original dataset,
of which 922,489 websites remain to be studied in our measurement. We understand
our heuristics, filtering-based method may still not be perfect, but we believe that the
method’s accuracy is high enough for performing a large-scale measurement, with few
errors at an acceptable level.
2.2.3 Validating the ADNS proxy
The use of the DNS proxy conceals the ADNS infrastructure and the proxy discovery is a
challenging problem since the DNS proxy exhibits the same behavior as a private ADNS
server from the viewpoint of external clients. We perform two di↵erent probing tests to
study the proxy infrastructure.
We first discover the usage of a proxy by roughly estimating the DNS response latency
within authoritative resolving infrastructure: if a DNS query undergoes a distinctly longer
response delay than a ping probe, the website has a very high probability of using a proxy.
We probe 138,240 private servers for 70,502 domains from three vantage points (at eastern-
, middle-, and western-US), and we observe that 73% of servers respond to the ping probes.
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Then, for each of those servers, we attempt to identify and normalize the time di↵erence
in response latency between ping probes and DNS queries. The normalized di↵erence
in response latency (i.e., round-trip-time, RTT ) between DNS and ping is computed as
below:
(RTTdns  RTTping)/RTTdns
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Figure 2.6: CDF for the di↵erence of responses by ping and dig.
We measure the normalized di↵erence values in three vantage points and define their
average as the relative di↵erence for each server. Figure 2.6 plots the distribution of
relative di↵erence. We observe that (1) the majority of servers (close 90%) whose relative
di↵erence values are less than 20%, but (2) indeed there are 3.4% and 1.8% of servers
whose relative di↵erence values are higher than 50% and 80%, respectively, i.e., their DNS
queries have response times 50% and 80% higher than the RTTs of ping probes. Assuming
the same or at least similar routing paths for consecutive ping probes and DNS queries,
even if we cannot accurately identify the proxy for each website, our probing results clearly
indicate that the use of ADNS proxy infrastructure does exist but the usage is very limited.
If a proxy enables the cache, we cannot use the relative di↵erence to detect the use
of a DNS proxy anymore, since the cache will respond to the queries and no significant
additional delay would be noticed. However, di↵erent from an ADNS direct response, in
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which TTL is a fixed default value, the TTL value of a proxy cached record decreases with
time elapse. This is because the cache at a DNS proxy will age the cached records like a
local resolver. That is, the answers from a proxy will have reduced TTLs. Moreover, the
time resolution in TTL is in seconds. Therefore, we send two successive queries with an
interval of 10 seconds to these ADNS addresses and then use the reduced TTL values to
detect the existence of a DNS proxy. In other words, if we can detect that the di↵erence of
TTLs between two successive DNS queries is round 10s, a proxy infrastructure may have
been adopted to conceal the actual ADNS servers. However, by probing 70,520 domains
with private deployment, we only find 75 (0.001%) domains where TTL-reduced records
from their ADNS servers occur. This observation is consistent with the proxy detection
result above, i.e., the ADNS proxy infrastructure is not used by most service owners.
Furthermore, comparing the two results (3.4% vs 0.001%), we can see that most ADNS
proxy servers simply relay the authoritative records to clients and no cache is used.
2.3 Measurement Results
This section presents the measurement results and analysis for the websites on Alexa’s
list. First we quantify the usage of deployment patterns and examine the fundamental
deployment configurations, such as the number of servers and TTLs of DNS records. Then
we present the performance study based on the probes from the geo-distributed locations
and analyze the availability for di↵erent patterns.
2.3.1 Overview
2.3.1.1 Deployment Patterns
Table 2.2 summarizes the pattern recognition in our dataset, based on the breakdown
by the top 100, 1,000, 10,000, and all records. The majority of websites delegate their
authoritative name resolution to upstream DNS-hosting services for the simple manage-
ment. The high-ranking sites are much more likely to deploy their own ADNS servers:
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the fraction of private deployment decreases sharply as the number of studied domains in-
creases. In addition, the percentage of hybrid-deploying domains remains stable on about
4-6% within top 10,000 websites but overall only 1.4% of websites are recognized as such
a deployment. Table 2.3 lists the top 10 web domains of each deployment pattern. Many
emerging top websites, especially the social sites popular on mobile web, such as Twitter,
Pinterest, and Tumblr, use the upstream services to facilitate the quick and convenient
deployment.
Table 2.2: Summary of Deployment Patterns
Patterns
Top 100 Top 1k Top 10k All
% % % # %
Private 68 34.1 18.76 70,520 7.6
Upstream 27 60.2 77.17 838,605 91.0
Hybrid 5 5.7 4.07 13,364 1.4
Total 100 100 100 922,489 100
Table 2.3: Top 10 sites for each deployment pattern
Private Upstream Hybrid
rk. Domain rk. Domain rk. Domain
1 google.com 9 amazon.com 15 linkedin.com
2 facebook.com 12 twitter.com 20 ebay.com
3 youtube.com 30 pinterest.com 65 cnn.com
4 yahoo.com 34 tumblr.com 84 ebay.de
5 baidu.com 38 paypal.com 99 ebay.co.uk
6 wikipedia.org 39 instagram.com 115 nytimes.com
7 qq.com 42 xvideos.com 120 pixnet.net
8 taobao.com 45 imdb.com 148 livedoor.com
10 live.com 48 ifeng.com 167 skype.com
11 sina.com.cn 49 amazon.co.jp 171 ups.com
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Figure 2.7: CDF for served domains of DNS-hosting domains.
2.3.1.2 DNS-hosting Providers
Here we examine the upstream DNS-hosting providers profiled by our dataset. Figure
2.7 shows the distribution of the number of served domains for extracted DNS-hosting
domains. The popularity of upstream domains is quite skewed. We observe that about
70% of hosting domains support fewer than 100 websites, and only 1.4% of hosting domains
serve websites more than 1,000.
Table 2.4 lists the top 10 DNS-hosting domains in terms of the number of websites
they support in Alexa’s list, with the number of servers identified in our dataset. These
top 10 domains serve for 26.7% of websites using upstream ADNS. If we include all the
domains with more than 1,000 served sites (i.e., 1.4% of hosting domains), this proportion
increases to 62.6%. Meanwhile, as the second column of Table IV shows, the quantities of
DNS-hosting servers vary considerably,9 from a few to thousands. This implies that the
DNS-hosting providers employ di↵erent system designs and implementations to achieve
the load-balancing and reliable upstream ADNS services.
Note that the numbers of websites in Table 2.4 are produced by extracting hosting
9These servers are identified by their hostnames. In some cases, the service providers prefix the clients’
domains to their nameservers to form the client-specific hostnames of ADNSes. This causes the over-
estimation of the number of servers for some providers (but not a common case).
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Table 2.4: Top DNS-hosting Domains
Domain # of servers # of websites
domaincontrol.com 96 61,455
cloudflare.com 107 27,821
hostgator.com 4,913 22,483
ovh.net 1,960 14,004
bluehost.com 6 12,307
worldnic.com 100 10,855
dnsmadeeasy.com 15 8,487
dnspod.net 12 8,404
name-services.com 13 8,338
dreamhost.com 5 7,593
domains, not the service providers. In fact, several providers o↵er hosting services through
multiple domains, e.g., Ultradns (see footnote 4), and Amazon’s DNS service. Amazon
deploys a set of hosting domains (256 found), named awsdns-⇥⇥.com/net/org/co.uk,
among which the quantities of served web domains remain balanced and stable (i.e., 220-
320).
2.3.2 Number of Nameservers
We quantify the usage of ADNS servers in terms of the deployment patterns. Figure 2.8
plots the cumulative distribution of the number of ADNS servers for each pattern.10
Generally, the websites using private ADNS servers tend to deploy slightly fewer servers
than the sites using upstream services. This indicates that those sites have the ability to
maintain a reliable DNS infrastructure, and various back-end techniques may be used, such
as load balancing and failover. On the other hand, simply using more upstream servers
is a convenient practice to achieve reliable name resolution. In addition, when looking at
the quantities in terms of ranks, as shown in Figure 2.9, we observe that the high-ranked
10We omit the plotting for the overall result since it would show a similar distribution with the upstream
pattern due to its dominant quantity.
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Figure 2.8: CDF for the number of ADNS servers.
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Figure 2.9: CDFs for the number of ADNS servers of top sites (private and upstream).
sites have more servers than others to handle the high-volume accesses. Figure 2.10 shows
the CDFs for the numbers of private and upstream servers in hybrid deployment. They
exhibit very similar distributions, and the number of servers for either type is less than
that in pure private or upstream pattern.
In our dataset, there are only 209 (< 0.02%) and 28 (< 0.003%) domains that have
more than 12 and 13 DNS servers, respectively. For easy presentation, we do not show
those domains in Figures 8-10. By briefly examining those websites equipped with a large
number of ADNS servers, we recognize that 60% of them having more nameservers are
mainly for the purpose of mutual delegation. That is, a group of websites are served by a
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Figure 2.10: CDF for the number of private and upstream servers in hybrid deployment.
set of nameservers that consist of the private servers from every site. These websites with
mutual delegation mainly fall into two categories: porn-related and loan-related websites,
perhaps for circumventing the local laws or web inspection. This observation implies that
the large number of ADNS servers could be a rough indicator of spam websites.
2.3.3 Time-to-Live Values
We now profile the Time-to-Live (TTL) settings of ADNS servers. Figure 2.11(a) shows
the cumulative distribution of TTL values of NS records for di↵erent ADNS deployment
patterns. We observe that the NS records extracted from the nameservers of a hybrid
deployment have shorter TTL values than the records of private and upstream patterns.
One possible reason to explain why this happens is that: the domain that decides to deploy
hybrid DNS servers demands high availability and reliability, thus its system administra-
tors are more meticulous and tend to maintain resilient configuration to quickly respond
to the changes on ADNS settings.
Figure 2.11(b) shows the distribution of TTL values of A records. The A records
of websites using upstream services have shorter TTL values since the majority of those
websites run small businesses and may change their service deployment more frequently.
The larger TTL values of websites following the hybrid pattern imply that those websites
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Figure 2.11: CDFs for TTL values.
indeed would like to maintain more stable services.
The larger TTL values of NS records have been identified by many prior studies [79,
65]. However, when comparing Figures 2.11(a) and 2.11(b), we observe that the hybrid
deployment pattern has very similar TTL distributions for the NS and A records, while
the NS records of private and upstream servers indeed demonstrate the larger TTL values
than their A records.
2.3.4 Life-cycle of ADNS Servers
Our probing experiments are performed based on the ADNS server dataset collected in
June 2014. After that, we also reproduced two additional lists of ADNS server information
in December 2014 and April 2015, for the same Alexa’s list in June 2014, to examine how
many records have been changed. We observe that 20.4% of ADNS records have been
changed in December 2014, and 33.5% of records have been changed in April 2015.11
We study the ADNS changes at di↵erent levels. We refer to all changes on ADNS
records as server change, i.e., the nameservers to be added, removed, or relocated. The
domain change means that the nameservers are relocated to di↵erent hosting domains.
The pattern change means that the websites re-deploy their ADNSes with a di↵erent
11All the change rates in April 2015 are based on the comparison with the original dataset in June 2014.
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infrastructure. Clearly, the domain change indicates the server change, and the pattern
change indicates both the server change and the domain change.
The detailed breakdown appears in Table 2.5. Although a large number of ADNS
records have been changed, we observe that the deployment patterns remain stable. The
websites using upstream DNS services frequently change their hosting domains (i.e., third-
party service providers), due to the low cost to migrate their authoritative records; but
they also have the lowest frequency to change their deployment patterns, due to the high
cost to deploy extra infrastructures to host their ADNS records.
Table 2.5: Summary of ADNS changes (%)
Patterns
Dec. 2014 Apr. 2015
Ser. Dom. Pat. Ser. Dom. Pat.
Private 23.2 4.57 2.90 37.5 7.09 4.51
Upstream 16.7 8.56 1.78 24.7 13.59 2.47
Hybrid 25.3 4.35 3.22 37.2 6.66 4.67
Overall 20.4 6.34 2.53 33.5 8.05 3.68
2.3.5 Performance
To evaluate the DNS performance, we performed the DNS lookups for each nameserver of
every domain, which involves 2,223,972 nameservers for 922,489 websites, from 70 globally
distributed PlanetLab [30] nodes, and then we clustered the response times into groups
according to the deployment patterns. The probings are performed twice each week during
a one-month period. Figure 2.12 plots the cumulative distribution of the response times
for each pattern. It demonstrates that the upstream services have a small but noticeable
performance advantage, since the mainstream DNS-hosting providers have established the
distributed infrastructure and spent significant e↵orts in optimizing their global access.
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Figure 2.12: CDF for Response Times of DNS Queries.
2.3.6 Availability
To examine the availability of authoritative DNS servers, we first analyze the responsive-
ness from the probing experiments above. During each probing period, we record a query’s
response time and retry the unresponsive servers up to three times before we drop the
probes. We then calculate the average rates of successful probes. We refer to the results
from the performance experiment as Probe 1.
However, the performance probes focus on the response time and do not reflect the
availability for a certain period of time. Thus, besides conducting the performance probes,
we also perform an active probe experiment with an exponentially distributed interval of
a one-hour mean, the same method used in [99], where the availability is defined as the
ratio of the number of probes being responded and the number of probes being sent. We
select four geo-distributed nodes (located at eastern- and western-US, Europe, and Asia)
to issue the probes and run the measurement for approximately five weeks. We refer to
the results from the exponential probes as Probe 2.
Table 2.6 summarizes the availability statistics from both probe sets. For each deploy-
ment pattern, its server availability refers to the ratio between the successfully responded
nameservers and the probed nameservers. The domain availability indicates the chance in
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Table 2.6: Summary of Availability (%)
Patterns
Probe 1 Probe 2
Server Domain Server Domain
Private 92.54 96.77 95.63 98.65
Upstream 94.44 97.76 98.87 99.04
Hybrid 94.33 97.71 96.93 99.89
Overall 93.54 97.47 97.39 98.98
percentage that at least one of the domain’s nameservers responds to the probes. The ma-
jority of ADNS servers are available for almost the entire duration. In both probe sets, the
servers in upstream deployment have the highest availability since they are more powerful
and expensive servers aiming to provide DNS services for many customers. At the domain
level, as one would expect, the hybrid deployment indeed exhibits higher availability than
the other two deployment patterns in Probe 2.12
We observe that a few servers become dead during the experiment of Probe 2. We
consider a nameserver becoming dead if the server remains no response for at least one
week and until the end of the experiment. The dead servers/domains are removed from
the results in Table VI. We observe that 3.3% of servers become dead, 87.4% of which are
private servers. We further perform another probing in April 2015 to check the status of
those severs that have been identified as dead in Probe 2. We find that only 6.4% of them
respond to the probes, which implies that the corresponding domains having responsive
servers now may have re-deployed their ADNS servers.
2.4 Cloud-hosting Subdomains
In this section, we explore the DNS deployment for subdomains hosted in IaaS clouds.
12In Probe 1, the upstream and hybrid deployment patterns demonstrate similar availability at the
domain level, perhaps due to the occurrence of temporary network outage or congestion during the probes.
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2.4.1 Deployment
We first extract the cloud-hosting subdomain list from [8] and reproduce the ADNS servers
of subdomains in July 2014. Since the subdomains are associated with the websites on
Alexa’s list,13 we use our private list to identify the private nameservers. Also, due to
the simplicity of cloud DNS and dominant quantity of subdomains in Amazon EC2, we
only examine the EC2-using subdomains in our study.
Here we split the upstream service providers into two categories: the cloud-provided
DNS and non-cloud-provided services (we still call them upstream providers). The ADNS-
hosting servers of Amazon are simply identified by their hostnames, including amazonaws,
awsdns, and CloudFront. We also add a new category of ADNS deployments, called cloud-
private, to represent the private DNS servers running atop EC2 instances. We extract the
primary domain parts and perform the search like our previous step in Section 2.3. If
we recognize a matching occurrence and the nameservers are not in the private list, we
check if its IP address is located in Amazon EC2’s IP range [4].
Table 2.7 summarizes the usage of the ADNS deployment patterns, showing a di↵erent
pattern usage. However, it would be similar to Table II if we combine the private and cloud-
private, as well as the upstream and cloud-provided, into one category. We also observe a
usage growth of cloud-provided DNS deployment from the original dataset (about 54%).
Figure 2.13 plots the number of nameservers used by the cloud-hosting subdomains, which
is slightly higher than the numbers shown in Figure 2.8.
2.4.2 Subdomain Delegation
Recall that in Figure 2.4(b), the primary websites may delegate the resolution of their
cloud-hosting subdomains to dedicated nameservers. We identify the delegation by ex-
tracting all subdomains’ CNAME records and search the CNAMEs in all NS records.
We observe that 4.7% of cloud-hosting subdomains use this deployment style, and 97.6%
13The subdomain list [8] was generated by Alexa’s list in February 2013. We exclude the subdomains
whose primary domains are not with Alexa’s list.
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Table 2.7: Summary of Deployment patterns for cloud subdomains (%)
Patterns %
private 11.49
cloud-private 5.40
upstream 15.20
cloud-provided 66.59
hybrid 1.32
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Figure 2.13: CDF for the number of ADNS servers.
of them delegate the subdomains to upstream DNS-hosting providers. Not surprisingly,
89.4% of upstream servers are identified as cloud-provided nameservers.
2.4.3 Life-cycle of Servers
Table 2.8 summarizes the statistics of the changes of DNS records for cloud-hosting sub-
domains. We recollected the DNS information in April 2015 to compare this dataset with
the original one [8] (from February 2013) and the dataset used in our study (from July
2014). We observe a much greater change rate for both nameservers and hosting domains
than the identified changes in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.8: Summary of DNS changes for cloud subdomains (%)
Change Pattern Jul. 2014 Apr. 2015
Server 35.49 47.51
Domain 18.27 24.68
Pattern 14.64 20.39
2.5 Related Work
Pang et al. [99] presented a comprehensive DNS study by characterizing the properties
of local and authoritative DNS infrastructures for the availability, usage, and deployment
of DNS. Sisson [19] presented a survey that reports the number of DNS servers on the
Internet and various aspects on configuration, such as the recursive support and security
configuration. Our work revisits several of their key findings and examines these proper-
ties with respect to the evolution of ADNS deployment associated with the use of cloud
and upstream resolvers. Schomp et al. [107] presented the measurement techniques to
discover the client-side DNS infrastructure and studied its behavior on caching. He et
al. [69] examined how modern web services are using the cloud for deployment of their
front ends. Our work focuses on the deployment and characteristics of authoritative DNS
infrastructure for cloud-hosting services.
There have been studies to investigate the DNS infrastructure. Gao et al. [65] con-
ducted a comprehensive measurement study on global DNS resolvers to rea rm some
findings in previous works and reveal the key di↵erences from root and local perspectives,
respectively. Callahan et al. [50] passively monitored DNS tra c within a residential
network to understand server behaviors and properties of the modern DNS system, such
as DNS responses and the violation of TTLs. Jung et al. [79] presented a detailed anal-
ysis of DNS traces to evaluate the client-perceived performance and the e↵ectiveness of
DNS caching, and to simulate the e↵ect of varying TTLs and sharing caches. Liang et al.
[88] investigated the latency of upper DNS hierarchy and studied the impact of uneven
distribution of top-level DNS servers on end-user latency. Pappas et al. [102] studied
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the reduced availability and increased query delays caused by DNS misconfigurations, and
presented three specific widespread types of misconfigurations: lame delegation, dimin-
ished server redundancy, and cyclic zone dependency. Ager et al. [36] compared the local
DNS resolvers against open DNS resolvers, i.e., GoogleDNS and OpenDNS, to examine
the latency of DNS resolvers and the content of DNS caches.
There have also been prior works to examine the characteristics of DNS services from
various aspects. Liston et al. [90] identified the diversity of DNS performance and investi-
gated the degree to which they vary from site to site. Deccio et al. [62] proposed a model
for server dependencies to measure DNS availability. Castro et al. [51] characterized the
workload at root servers and analyzed some trends for DNS evolution, such as DNSSEC
and DNS IPv6. Berger et al. [46] examined the associations between IPv6 addresses and
IPv4 addresses of Internet DNS resolvers. Ramasubramanian et al. [105] studied the
security aspects of nameserver dependencies and delegations. Cranor et al. [58] identified
the distribution of DNS servers in clusters. Otto et al. [97] studied the end-to-end impact
of using remote DNS services in CDN, which breaks the assumption that the location of
clients’ DNS resolvers is close to the actual location of clients.
2.6 Summary
We conduct a large-scale measurement study to quantify the deployment patterns of au-
thoritative DNS servers and examine the characteristics of the patterns. We develop a
simple heuristics-based method to determine the ADNS deployment patterns of web do-
mains on Alexa’s top 1-million list. We observe that a majority of websites host the
ADNSes in upstream services, but the top-ranked sites tend to deploy their own ADNSes.
We then perform a probing experiment and observe the performance advantage from up-
stream services. The hybrid pattern exhibits the high availability due to the redundant
deployment. Finally we examine the usage of ADNSes for cloud-hosting subdomains, and
observe a noticeable growth in the use of cloud-providing DNS hosting services.
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Chapter 3
Exploring Domain Name Based
Features on the E↵ectiveness of
DNS Caching
DNS cache plays a critical role in domain name resolution for reduced workloads and low
response latency to clients. In this work, we study the negative e↵ect on DNS caching
caused by a new class of domain name misuse, the “one-time-use” or disposable domains,
and explore and validate the features that could be used to identify this class of misused
domain names, without employing complicated deep inspection techniques.
Since most misused domains, either malicious or benign, tend to transmit information
over DNS query names, we explore the distinct features from domain name itself that
are explicitly available from individual queries. Based on DNS trace logs captured in the
resolvers of campus networks, we extract the re-used and once-used RRs. The reused
RRs indicate that the queried domains are retrieved for multiple times, and the once-used
RRs only appeared once in one trace. By analyzing a large amount of once-used entries,
we observe that several explicit domain name-based features are capable to characterize
the reusability of domain names. Based on these features, we propose simple policies to
enhance the e↵ectiveness of DNS caching by preliminarily excluding those unreusable RRs.
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In order to validate their capability, we quantify the statistical properties of each feature
and build a classifier that combines the features. Our classification results demonstrate
that our policies are able to prevent around 85% once-used RRs from being cached while
only less than 1% reusable RRs are mistakenly kept out of the cache.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the background
of DNS caching and disposable domains in §3.1. We present the proposed domain name-
based features on DNS caching in §3.2. We analyze the collected datasets and build a
classifier to validate our features in §3.3, and conduct a trace-driven evaluation in §3.4.
We survey related work in §3.5. Finally, we conclude in §3.6.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 DNS Caching
Recursive DNS resolvers retrieve the name resolution results for clients and cache the
received responses to answer the following queries. The duration that the cached records
would be valid is specified by a time-to-live (TTL) value.
In standard TTL-based caching, the TTL value is set and handed out by the adminis-
trator of authoritative DNS record, and the cached entries are expunged after their TTLs
expire. The duration for caching a negative response (e.g., NXDOMAIN, NODATA, etc.)
is given by the TTL value of SOA record [38]. However, although the TTL-aging-based
behavior is legible, the violation of TTL is observed pervasively both in modern web
browsers and DNS infrastructures [50]. For instance, many browsers and resolvers assign
a minimum amount of seconds for holding a RR, and many resolvers trim the large TTL
values to a default maximum value.
3.1.2 Domain Name Misuses
The use of DNS in various ways for which it was not originally designed has been observed
for many years. For example, DNS is exploited as an e↵ective covert channel for surrepti-
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tious communications [103, 127]. Moreover, Chen et al. [54] studied disposable domains,
a more generic class of domain misuse where the query names are adopted to convey the
“one-time signals”. These domains are not necessarily malicious and are observed per-
vasively from various types of service providers, including popular search engines, social
networks, CDNs, and security companies, and have being increased to a significant portion
of queried domains on the Internet. Due to the “one-time-use” pattern and the increasing
use of such domains, the DNS cache would be filled with entries with near-zero hit rates.
Our work is mainly built on their analysis for disposable domains.
3.2 Domain Name-Based Features
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Figure 3.1: Sample of domains with the domain name-based features
Domain names are human-readable and easy-to-remember character sets. However,
the once-used domains exploit the query names as a communication channel. One of
our insights is that such misused domains are encoded automatically to convey formatted
information and should have significantly di↵erent patterns on their names from normal
domain names.
Therefore, we consider the possibility of characterizing the once-used domains, and
then exploit the derived features to filter out the disposable domains. The removal of
such once-used domains from the DNS cache will improve its performance, because the
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pervasive use of misused domains has the DNS cache occupied by those entries that are
highly unlikely to be reused. Figure 3.1 presents the preliminary examples that motivate
our feature selection. We simply plot the distributions of the query name length and the
number of subdomains (i.e., the subdomain depth), respectively, for all observed query
names and distinct domain names from one of our trace logs (§3.3). It is evident that (1)
most repeatedly appeared domains have short name and limited subdomain depth and (2)
a significant portion of domains have long query name and a large number of subdomains.
This implies that, under a limited memory space, discarding those entries with long name
or deep subdomain as they are scarcely to be retrieved again, would save more space in
the cache to store the entries with higher possibility of being re-used, and thus e↵ectively
improve the caching e↵ectiveness.
Based on the analysis of large amounts of once-used domains, we identified that the
domain name-based features, such as the two features above, are able to characterize the
caching behavior of domains, without the help of sophisticated features used in detection
of malicious domains (e.g., the behavioral features in EXPOSURE [47] and statistical
features in Notos [39]). As a result, we propose the following features and explain why
they may a↵ect the caching e↵ectiveness. In spite of straightforwardness, all but the first
one have not yet been characterized in the analysis of DNS and none of them has been
studied in context of caching performance.
• F1: Length of query name: Since most of once-used domains tend to send mes-
sages over DNS queries, those domains naturally have (much) longer query names
to pack as much information as possible and would hardly be reusable. Thus, we
consider that there could be a strong correlation between the length of query names
and once-used RRs in the cache.
• F2: Length of the longest-subdomain name: Similar to the query name, the
individual lower-level name, i.e., the string representing a subdomain, could also be
larger than a legitimate subdomain name that tends to be “easy-to-remember”.
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• F3-a: Subdomain depth: To report information over DNS, the implications of
domain names have to be easily recognized by the receivers. In doing so, the domain
separator, i.e., the period “.”, would naturally be employed to format the domains to
give the name strings meaningful information, resulting in a deep subdomain level,
i.e., a large number of subdomains in one query name.
• F3-b: Number of format fields: Like the period specifying the subdomain level,
we also observed that the hyphen “-” is widely used as field separator to format the
messages in one subdomain name.
Due to the similarity on their function, in our study we treat both the periods (F3-a)
and hyphens (F3-b) as equal format separators and employ the same term, “number of
format fields” (F3), to represent the number of strings separated by either “.” or “-”.
• F4: Number of fields with unusual lengths: To represent various pre-defined
types of information inserted in specified positions, the length of format strings would
vary widely and many of the fields would be either unusually long or unusually short.
We consider that such domains are also quite hard to be reused. Thus, we define a
metric of the sum of the number of long-format-field (L-FF) and short-format-field
(S-FF) within one query name to identify such a feature.
Figure 3.2 shows the sample of domains with the explicit features. Note that these
features, e.g., the length of query names, do not necessarily indicate the malicious purposes
[103] (actually most of them are benign). However, they indeed indicate the usage of
“signaling” and thus imply the high possibility of “one-time-use” pattern. Thus, there
would be a strong correlation between each feature above and once-used RRs in the cache.
By exploiting these features, we can revise the caching policies to proactively prevent those
RRs that are less likely to be reused from being cached, such that the e↵ectiveness of DNS
caching could be significantly improved.
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Figure 3.2: Example of distribution for lengths and depths
Methodology. For the proposed features, we characterize the properties of re-used
and once-used domains, train a classifier to classify the entries, and conduct a trace-
driven simulation to validate their e cacy on caching. In the feature validation (§4.2) and
classification (§4.3), the analysis simply relies on the domain names and assumes implicitly
that both the cache size and TTL values are unlimited. This assumption simply creates
an ideal scenario for caching RRs, and cache hits are not limited by the cache size and
TTL values. The simulation (§5.2) runs within a resolver program that caches the entries
according to the classification results and common practices on modern DNS resolvers.
3.3 Measurement Analysis
3.3.1 Dataset
The datasets used in the study are the trace logs of outgoing DNS queries over a period
of two weeks at local DNS servers in College of William and Mary (WM) and University of
Delaware (UD). We summarize the datasets in Table 3.1.
The trace logs from campus vantage points have two limitations. (1) The traces may
not reflect the dynamics of domain names observed at ISP’s DNS servers. However, due to
the similar patterns of disposable domains from a large-scale ISP dataset reported in [54],
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Table 3.1: Summary of datasets
Dataset Dates # Records # Distinct name # Reused # Un-reused Features†
WM 6/25/2015 - 7/8/2015 192,251,799 4,470,732 619,045 3,851,687 N, S, K, T
UD 12/8/2015 - 12/23/2015 1,011,877,341 13,179,395 2,852,021 10,327,374 S‡,, T
† Features: Query Name (N), Structure of Domain Name (S), Query Type (K), and Query Timestamp
(T)
‡ In UD dataset, the actual query names are anonymized but remain distinguishable to identify reappear-
ance. Meanwhile, the structure of domains is given by the length of each format field (e.g., a.b.c-d-e.f.g,
where each letter represents the length of each field).
we believe that the proposed policies would be also e↵ective in ISP’s DNS cache, especially
due to the heavy load on their resolvers. Also, we removed the RR entries that retrieve
the local domains. (2) The length of our trace logs is limited. We believe, however, it is
still capable to demonstrate the typical cache usage patterns of local resolvers since the
origin TTL values of A/AAAA records are typically shorter than one day [65].
3.3.2 Feature Validation
Given the heuristics presented in §3.2, we validate our speculation that these explicit
domain name-based features will help to improve the e↵ectiveness of DNS caching. From
Table 3.1, we can see that 86.15% and 78.63% of queried domains appeared only once in
each dataset, which are similar to the results of identified disposable domains [54]. In our
study, however, we do not attempt to achieve high detection accuracy in identifying such
a class of domains. Instead, we focus on exploring the e cacy of proposed features on
improving the overall cache performance by avoiding a large number of once-used records
being filled in the cache.
To validate each proposed feature based on its factual caching e↵ect, we tentatively
derive a threshold to measure the fractions of excluded domains. We then leverage a
learning module to train our dataset and build a classifier that combines the proposed
features.
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3.3.2.1 F1: Length of Query Name
Figure 3.3(a) shows that the distributions of the query name length in which the two
classes of domains are clearly distinguishable from each other. The majority of once-used
domains apparently have much longer name length than the re-used domains.
To exclude the useless RRs, we start to consider a tentative threshold at 50 bytes of
query name length. In WM dataset, a threshold of 50 bytes would exclude 81.10% of once-
used domains and 1.61% of re-used domain, resulting in that overall 69.87% of entries are
rejected from the cache. By gradually raising the threshold, at the length of 100 bytes we
observe that 0.027% of reusable domains are mistakenly dropped while 44.99% of once-
used domains (totally 38.77% of RRs) are discarded. Similarly, with the length of 100
bytes, in UD dataset, 0.019% of re-used entries are mistakenly kept out of the cache while
32.58% of once-used domains (totally 25.53% of RRs) are dropped. Such results indicate
that rejecting those domains with large names would significantly reduce the waste of
cache space but keep the cache hit ratio at the same level.
3.3.2.2 F2: Length of the Longest Subdomain Name
Figure 3.3(b) demonstrates that the large strings are widely adopted in once-used domains.
Specifically, with each dataset, we identify 3.03% and 1.51% of re-used entries, as well as
73.40% and 68.05% of once-used entries, include one subdomain with the length of more
than 20 bytes, respectively. If we increase the threshold to 30 bytes, the fractions of re-
used domains will decline to 0.39% and 0.30% while the fractions of once-used domains
remain at 69.86% and 57.22%, respectively. Thus, a length of a subdomain name greater
than 30 bytes would strongly indicate that the domain is once-used, with little chance of
being a useful entry if cached.
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3.3.2.3 F3: Number of Format Fields
Figure 3.3(c) presents the distribution of the total number of format fields. It is easy to
identify that a threshold of 10 is capable to distinguish the reusability for each class of
domains. Using this threshold, we can exclude 0.59% and 0.79% of re-used entries, and
31.17% and 42.39% of once-used domains, respectively, from each dataset; overall, around
25% and 37% of entries would be discarded from the cache, respectively.
3.3.2.4 F4: Total number of L-FF and S-FF
In order to profile the total number of the long-format-field (L-FF) and the short-format-
field (S-FF), we first empirically determine the specific values of the length to define the
L-FF and S-FF. Since most of TLDs include one or two fields with two or three characters,
we define the S-FF as the fields with the characters less than or equal to three.1 Also,
we investigate the distributions of F4 by varying the length of L-FF, and observe that a
length of 10 is su cient to demonstrate the distinct statistical properties for this feature.
Figure 3.3(d) shows the distribution of the sum of L-FF (>10 bytes) and S-FF (63
bytes). With a clear threshold observed at five, we identify that 0.61% of re-used and
70.03% of once-used domains in WM’s dataset (overall 60.33% of RRs), and 0.40% of re-
used and 74.55% of once-used domains in UD’s dataset (overall 63.97% of RRs), would be
discarded. As a result, this would exclude the majority of the useless entries but have
little negative impact on caching reusable domains.
3.3.3 The Classifier
To validate the e cacy of the combination of proposed features, we train the datasets with
both decision tree and random forest models [117], by using the rpart and randomForest
packages in R, respectively. Note that we leveraged the class-weights (i.e., the parms
1A more accurate approach may need to exclude the TLDs (e.g., .com and .co.uk) and SLDs
(second-level domains, e.g., msn and cnn) since they may be regarded as the S-FF. However, we
observe that checking the entire domain names has already produced e↵ective results, and thus we
decide to use a simple way to avoid introducing additional steps to identify the SLDs.
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parameter in rpart and the classwt parameter in randomForest) to handle unbalanced
class size in our datasets.
Ground truth. Since it is (almost) impossible to have a ground truth that identifies
the “disposable domains”, we label the once-appeared domains extracted from datasets
as disposable domains. As such, our labels correspond to those assigned by an oracle
with perfect knowledge. Although the domain unpopularity may cause mis-labeling (i.e.,
some unpopular domains may be mis-labeled as disposable), our labels are the acceptable
approximation to the ground truth in practice, especially given more than thousands of
users from each campus network. Moreover, mis-labelling a rarely re-used domain as
disposable would have marginal impact on practical caching performance, being it likely
to be evicted before reappearing.
Evaluation of the classifiers. Each dataset is divided into mutually exclusive train-
ing and testing partitions, where 66% of the dataset is used for training and the rest is
used for testing. With the random forest model, we observe that the benefit cannot be
achieved with the number of constructed trees higher than five. Table 3.2 lists the per-
centage of incorrectly classified instances using the combination of all features.2 Note that
we aim to improve the caching e↵ectiveness in two folds: (1) e↵ectively reject the useless
entries, and (2) minimize the negative impact on the reusable entries. The results in Table
2 demonstrate that we can achieve both goals in the classification processes. They also
indicate that, although the simple decision tree tends to overfit the training set, it is able
to produce accurate results when applied to the classifier constructed by the combination
of proposed features. More specifically, around 85% to 88% of once-used RRs are correctly
labeled and expelled from the cache, while only 0.2% to 1% of re-used RRs are incorrectly
classified in WM and UD datasets, respectively.
The unbalanced (but expected and positive) results can be interpreted by the obser-
vation that, the re-used entries have more consistent and concentrated distributions of
2We explored the di↵erent combinations of feature sets and found that using all features in the
classification can achieve the minimum error rate.
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Table 3.2: Percentage of mis-classified instances
Decision Tree Random Forest (ntree=5)
D R O D R O
WM 16.07% 0.26% 13.88% 12.93% 0.19% 11.16%
UD 13.91% 0.98% 14.13% 11.89% 0.34% 12.18%
D with Disposable, R with Re-used, O with Overall
features, while the extracted features from once-used entries exhibit more di↵use distri-
butions.
Figure 3.4 shows the index of variable importance and the primary split values in
decision tree training for each dataset, which illustrates that (1) all the features play
important roles in the classification (the importance index varies from 21 to 31) and (2)
although the primary split values are more aggressive than the thresholds derived from
any single feature (§3.2), we can further lower the error rates by using the combination of
features.
3.4 Trace-Driven Simulation
In §3.3, we demonstrate that the explicit domain name-based features are useful to infer
the reusability of RRs. However, in practice the resolvers behave slightly di↵erently due
to the presence of TTLs. The re-used entries may still cause the cache misses as the
cached RRs have been expired. Meanwhile, some mis-classified reusable entries may not
a↵ect the caching performance since many of them have a lower possibility to be retrieved
again within the duration of TTL. In this section, we apply the classifier in §3.3 with the
combination of proposed features to conduct a trace based simulation3 to evaluate the
e↵ectiveness of proposed policies.
3We only perform the simulation with the WM’s trace since the actual domains have been
anonymized in the UD’s trace.
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3.4.1 Implementation
We implemented the proposed caching policies in a simulated resolver program modified
from djbdns [12], in which the decisions employ the classification results from §3.3. Our
resolver program follows the standard TTL model, i.e., do not assign a default minimum
TTL value. The duration of negative caching is subject to the TTL values of SOA records
[38]. Moreover, we do not set the cleaning-interval to periodically expel the stale records
due to the use of sophisticated memory management in modern resolvers [6]. Only when
hitting the cache limit, will some entries be prematurely evicted from the cache (e.g., using
LRU replacement policy).
Types of RRs. First we study the caching properties of di↵erent types of RRs.
In particular, we examine if they need to be given discriminative considerations when
caching in resolvers. Table 3.3 lists the breakdown for the types of queries. The SOAs are
treated as same as A/AAAAs, i.e., caching such RRs according to the proposed policies
in §3.3. Other unspecified types of RRs are not particularly studied because of their small
amounts.
Table 3.3: Summary of RR Types
A AAAA TXT PTR SRV SOA NS MX other†
70.80% 15.33% 5.09% 3.96% 3.86% 0.83% 0.08% 0.03% 0.03%
†Other types include: ANY, NAPTR, DS, DNSKEY, CNAME, AFSDB, AFXR
• TXT records: We identify that only 0.01% of TXT records have been reused,
and indeed observe that the TXTs are being used as an information channel. We
observed the similar distributions of proposed features in TXTs and thus use the
proposed policies for caching TXTs.
• Reserve lookup queries (PTRs): We do not apply the modifications on PTRs
since PTR is rarely being misused and we do not observe the studied features taking
e↵ect on PTRs.
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• Service records (SRVs): We identify that most SRVs (97.46%) are involved with
the local queries that have been removed in our study (§3.3.1). Like PTRs, we also
observe that the studied features have no impact on SRVs’ caching e↵ectiveness
either, and thus we will not apply the polices on SRVs.
• NS records: Caching NS records can significantly enhance the e ciency of DNS
and reduce the load on name severs [79]. Also, the number of NS records is much
smaller than the other types of RRs above. Thus, there is no need to apply the
policies on NS records. In fact, no NS records would be excluded on caching if the
proposed policies were applied.
3.4.2 Results
We now evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the proposed policies given a fixed cache memory
allocation. To simplify the assessment, we define the cache allocation by the number of
RRs. We input the RRs to a cache file and then examine the cache hit rate, which is
calculated as the ratio between the number of cache hits and the total number of retrieved
RRs.
We need to determine how many RRs should be cached to represent a real scenario for
the evaluation of our proposed policies. Jung et al. [79] identified that the DNS cache hit
ratio is between 80% and 87%. Thus, we choose our cache size as the number of cached
RRs that can achieve a similar cache hit ratio. To this end, given the moderate size of
our dataset and an FIFO replacement policy, i.e., simply remove the oldest entry when
the cache runs out of space, we observe that a size of 100,000 entries would have a cache
hit rate about 86%. Therefore, we set the cache size to 100,000 RRs in our simulations.
Note that this setting is derived from local campus networks and in ISPs’ DNS server, a
larger cache size is needed because of the larger number of DNS queries.
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3.4.2.1 FIFO
We first evaluate the proposed policies with an FIFO caching scheme, which is still widely
used in popular DNS resolvers such as djbdns [12]. Figure 3.5(a) presents the measured
cache hit rates under the FIFO, with and without proposed polices, respectively. We
observe that the modified caching policies can improve the cache hit rate by about 8%
with the cache size of 100,000 entries.
3.4.2.2 Pseudo-LRU
We then evaluate the proposed policies with a simplified pseudo-LRU that leverages one
bit to store the cache status for each entry (i.e., the MRU-bit). When a cache hit occurs
for an entry, its cache bit is set to 1. When the cache is full, the oldest entry with the
cache bit 0 is evicted. When the cache bits of all cached entries have been set to 1, all the
bits are cleaned to 0 except the last one.
Figure 3.5(b) shows measured cache hit rates with the LRU replacement scheme. We
observe that the proposed caching modifications improve the cache hit rate by about 7%.
Compared with FIFO, LRU without our policies can increase the cache hit rate by about
2%. With the proposed modifications, both FIFO and LRU can increase the cache hit
rate to 92%-93%.
3.4.3 Discussion
TTL values. The lower TTL values have been observed in both malicious domains [47]
and disposable domains [54]. However, the domain owners are free to set the TTLs and
they have been switching to use larger TTL values (most of them have a TTL of 300s [54]),
resulting in the larger duration of the useless entries being regarded as valid in the cache.
Meanwhile, since modern resolvers have obsoleted the cleaning-interval [6], caching the
once-used domains even for a short time still degrades the performance. This is because
the cache is filled with such useless entries and no space is left for caching the useful
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entries. Thus, TTL may not be a reliable indicator of the caching e↵ectiveness and we do
not consider it as a metric to quantify the caching behavior.
Counteraction. One may concern that the domain owners could circumvent our polices
by changing the structure of domain names. However, we believe the modifications will not
provoke them to seek more sophisticated approaches since those “one-time use” domains
have accomplished the communication mission and the developers using such approaches
would not care much if their DNS responses are cached.
3.5 Related Work
DNS Caching and TTL characterization. Pang et al. [100] presented a compre-
hensive study on DNS, and [99] observed that a significant fraction of web clients and
LDNSes do not honor DNS TTLs. Callahan et al. [50] passively monitored DNS tra c
within a residential network to profile the modern DNS behaviors and properties. They
also observed that web browsers do not adhere to the given TTLs and CDNs tend to shape
tra c with shorter TTLs.
Jung et al. [79] presented a detailed analysis on DNS traces to evaluate the client-
perceived performance and the e↵ectiveness of DNS caching. They [78] then presented an
analytic method of modeling the cache hit rate given consistent TTLs. Choungmo-Fofack
et al. [64] studied the DNS cache hierarchy, in which the TTLs are overridden by the local
values.
Cache modifications. Shang et al. [111] proposed an approach to improve the DNS
caching by letting the ADNS’s response piggyback extra resolution results for future
queries predicted by site usage and DNS history. Cohen et al. [56] studied the proactive
renewal policies in LDNSes, where the expired records are reused to answer the queries
and are validated with a concurrent query. Similarly, Ballani et al. [44] proposed a minor
change in caching behavior of DNS resolvers to mitigate the DNS DoS attacks, where the
expired records are stored in a separate “stale cache” and reused to answer the queries
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unresponded by authoritative servers.
Malicious domain detection. There have been studies to understand and detect the
malicious domains. Hao et al. [68] examined the features that may indicate malicious
purposes of a domain during its registration. Antonakakis et al. [40, 41] and Yadav et
al. [106] proposed methods to detect dynamically generated malicious domains in DNS
tra c. Bilge et al. [47] built a passive analysis system extracting 15 features to detect
malicious domains. Two of the features, similar to our work, are domain name-based: (1)
the percentage of numerical characters and (2) the ratio of the length of LMS (longest-
meaningful substring) to the total length of a second-level domain. The most salient
di↵erence is that our work focuses on the caching behaviors, regardless of a domain being
malicious or benign. Also, the features we used are more simple and straightforward (e.g.,
the second feature above requires checking the English dictionary).
3.6 Summary
We presented an empirical study on the domain name-based features of DNS queries and
exploited these features for improving DNS cache performance. The identified features,
including the length of a query name, the length of the longest-subdomain, and the number
of subdomains or format fields, are explicitly available from a domain name itself, without
involving the deep inspections. Whereas the features do not indicate malicious purposes,
the majority of the domains with such properties are indeed associated with the one-time-
use pattern and would be highly unlikely to be reused in DNS cache. Our analysis and
simulation demonstrate that proactively rejecting such domains from cache can improve
the overall e↵ectiveness of DNS caching. Finally, we make one of our traces used in this
chapter publicly available [8], with proper anonymization but being able to perform the
training and simulation.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of domain name-based features for Reused and Un-reused do-
mains
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read into the resolver.
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Chapter 4
End Users Get Maneuvered:
Empirical Study of Redirection
Hijacking in Content Delivery
Networks
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) place a large number of edge servers (a.k.a. surro-
gates) at geographically distributed edge networks and deliver a large fraction of Internet
content to end users by providing content caching and proximal access. The majority of
mapping components in today’s CDNs rely on the Domain Name System (DNS) to de-
termine the redirection decision for a client’s request, i.e., assigning a nearby edge server
for the client. However, such a DNS-based mapping system requires DNS records to be
dynamically generated in real-time, which restrains those dynamic records from authen-
ticating their mapping DNS records by using DNSSEC signatures since DNSSEC was
originally designed for static records. Furthermore, even considering DNSSEC enabled,
DNSSEC itself is vulnerable to replay attacks.
In this study, we conduct a large-scale empirical study to investigate the security
implications in the DNS-based mapping system of CDNs, which can be exploited by
CHAPTER 4. REDIRECTION HIJACKING IN CDNS 55
adversaries to hijack the operation of request redirection in a very stealthy manner. Our
work makes following contributions:
• Illustration of Redirection Hijacking Attacks in CDNs: While DNSSEC is
not designed to immune, the security posture introduced by CDN’s dynamic map-
ping remains understudied. As DNSSEC is vulnerable to a replay attack, we il-
lustrate that an adversary can utilize a legitimate mapping record (i.e., a replayed
message) to override CDN’s server selection and redirect a certain group of users
to an edge server chosen by the adversary. Worrisomely, even the newly adopted
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) that is capable of providing
real-time DNSSEC signatures is ine↵ective to detect and prevent such attacks.
• Characterization of Operational Practices of CDN’s Request Routing:
To assess the magnitude of this vulnerability, we characterize the content delivery
operations of popular CDN vendors and perform the threat analysis to elaborate
on the ine↵ectiveness of DNSSEC against redirection hijacking via detailed case
studies. We find that 16 out of 20 popular CDN providers su↵er from various degree
of security threats posed by redirection hijacking.
• Measurement of Practical Impacts of Redirection Hijacking: We quan-
titatively measure the practical impacts caused by redirection hijacking, such as
performance degradation and cached content popularity. Moreover, we examine
more serious threats, by which adversaries could exploit redirection hijacking to di-
rect end-users to unresponsive edge servers, resulting in the nullification of CDN’s
benefits (e.g., load balance and DoS mitigation) and the violation of CDN’s service
commitments.
• Challenges and Practical Considerations of Countermeasures: Finally,
we present the challenges of addressing this redirection hijacking from di↵erent per-
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spectives, and elaborate on corresponding countermeasures in practice and their
limitations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we review the
background of DNS security and CDN operations. In Section 4.2, we present the threat
model and the redirection-hijacking attack. In Section 4.3, we characterize CDN’s op-
erations and perform a large-scale threat analysis, illustrating that DNSSEC is not an
e↵ective solution. We then discuss the impact of current practice and potential counter-
measures in Section 4.4. We survey related work in Section 4.5, and finally we conclude
the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 DNS Cache Poisoning Attack
DNS provides a vital naming service for users to locate Internet resources by translating
domain names to numerical IP addresses, and thus the correctness of DNS resolution
is the fundamental anchor for the operation and security of the Internet. Due to its
crucial role in accessing Internet services, DNS is an attractive target of adversaries and
has been exploited for various malicious purposes. One of the most serious threats to
DNS is that adversaries trick a resolver to accept fraudulent DNS records as legitimate
responses from authoritative nameservers, known as record injection or cache poisoning
attacks [43, 80, 33, 115].
DNS cache is intrinsically vulnerable to record injection, because a recursive resolver
cannot ensure whether a received response is from a legitimate authoritative nameserver or
a miscreant entity. The general practical approach to mitigating a cache poisoning attack
involves the challenge-response defenses [77], including transaction-ID (TXID) randomiza-
tion, source port randomization, or the 0x20 encoding [60], in order to enable a resolver to
validate the legitimacy of received responses via the randomized values within the requests.
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Although those countermeasures increase the di culty of injecting fraudulent records,
insu cient adoptions and deployment [70, 72, 112] have made many rDNSes still vulnera-
ble to cache poisoning attacks. Large-scale DNS poisoning attacks are still widely observed
on the Internet [18, 24, 25]. Furthermore, all those e↵orts aiming to increase the entropy
of DNS queries are only e↵ective against the o↵-path attackers; an adversary, which can
monitor network tra c and interpret the transaction packets, is still able to construct a
forged DNS response with correct parameters to bypass all the challenge-response defenses
and pollute the content of cache, i.e., launch a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.
4.1.2 DNSSEC
In order to secure the process of DNS resolution, especially against MitM attacks, DNSSEC
[42] uses the digital signatures to validate DNS responses. Within DNSSEC, each resource
record set (RRset) is signed and verified by public key cryptography: a recipient of a
signed RRset (i.e., RRSIG record) is able to validate the signature via the public key (i.e.,
DNSKEY record) of signer, and the trust of chain, starting from “trust anchor” at a root
zone, ensures that each key is trusted and able to be validated by its parent zone (i.e., DS
record).
DNSSEC Zone Enumeration. Within DNSSEC, to provide authentication for neg-
ative response (i.e., authenticated denial of existence), a Next-SECure (NSEC) record lists
and signs a pair of lexicographic consecutive names in the zone, indicating that no names
exist between the NSEC’s owner name and the “next” name. However, NSEC records ex-
pose the existence of names in the zone; this then allows adversaries to enumerate NSEC
records and walk through the zone space to learn all the (sub)domains and associated
IP addresses, i.e., the zone enumeration attack, resulting in undesired policy violation or
more complex attacks [86].
In order to make the zone enumeration more di cult, the alternative NSEC3 record [86]
lists the cryptographically hashed names rather than valid (sub)domain names. However,
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it is still vulnerable when adversaries apply an dictionary attack by querying non-existent
names and guessing real names [9, 67]. Thus, NSEC5 [67] is then proposed to replace the
NSEC3’s unkeyed hash with a new keyed hash generated by separate secondary keys.
Another technique to mitigate zone enumeration is “On-line Signing” [125, 114] (i.e.,
White Lies” [66]). Instead of disclosing real domains or precomputed hashes, on-line
signing creates on-demand signature, proving non-existence for a specific name by listing
derived predecessor and/or successor. However, this approach has two drawbacks: (1)
with traditional RSA algorithm, it introduces significant computational load for authori-
tative nameservers to generate real-time signatures, resulting in potential denial of service
attacks, and (2) the primary private keys have to be distributed among nameservers,
increasing the risk of key leakage.
DNSSEC Live Signing by ECDSA. To mitigate zone enumeration and DNSSEC
amplification attacks [121], the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [73]
has been employed as an alternative cryptosystem for DNSSEC [122]. Di↵erent from tra-
ditional RSA-based schemes, ECDSA leverages the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
to generate signatures with dramatically reduced computational overhead and signature
size. More importantly, while validating an ECDSA-based signature is fundamentally
slower than validating an RSA-based signature [73, 119], the significantly reduced com-
putational overhead (about 10x faster in signing [10]) allows ECDSA to sign all of the
necessary RRSIG records “on-the-fly” [10], i.e., a live signing mechanism, providing a
potential solution in the context of dynamically generated records at the “edge” of the
Internet.
4.1.3 Content Delivery Network
4.1.3.1 DNS-based Mapping System
The mapping system plays a critical role in CDN’s request routing for directing each
client’s request to an appropriate surrogate, which is proximity to a client and has (1) suf-
CHAPTER 4. REDIRECTION HIJACKING IN CDNS 59
ficient resource capacity to be responsive and (2) high possibility with requested content
cached, leading to an improved user-perceived performance (e.g., low latency). Tradi-
tionally, the mapping system uses a client’s local recursive DNS resolvers (LDNSes or
rDNSes) as the representation of the local area network where a client resides to deter-
mine the client’s location and assign a neighboring edge server cluster. However, this
approach has become inaccurate due to (1) poor location proximity between clients and
their LDNSes [110, 92] and (2) increasing usage of public DNS services such as Google
Public DNS and OpenDNS. To this end, the EDNS-Client-Subnet (ECS) extension [57]
has been proposed to rectify the problem of location discrepancy between clients and their
recursive DNS resolvers.
EDNS-Client-Subnet (ECS). Within ECS, the information of the network prefix of
a client’s IP address (i.e., the local area network from which a query is sent) is included in
the option field of a DNS query. Namely, this extension enables the DNS-based mapping
system to use the direct knowledge of a client’s location, instead of using its LDNS. A
recent study by Chen et al. [52] showed that Akamai’s end-user mapping1 rolled out by
ECS had been providing significant performance benefits for the clients behind public DNS
services.
Load Balancing. The load balancing module of a DNS-based CDN such as Akamai
typically selects proper surrogates by a two-level assignment [52, 91]: global load balancing
and local load balancing. The global load balancing relies on network measurements to
select a server cluster, typically geographically close to a client’s network. Then, the local
load balancing assigns the individual server(s) from the chosen cluster, leveraging the
combined information such as responsiveness and capacity.
1In [52], the “end-user mapping” is used to dedicatedly describe ECS-based mapping (compared
to the NS-based mapping which uses LDNSes). To be clarified, in this chapter we use “DNS-based
mapping” to include both ECS- based and NS-based mapping. In most cases, unless specified,
we do not di↵erentiate the “DNS-based mapping” and the “end-user mapping” since they have
identical implication in the context of dynamic mapping.
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4.1.3.2 Anycast Routing
The deployment of the DNS-based dynamic mapping requires extra infrastructure and op-
erational supports. Therefore, some new CDN providers then enable their CDN platforms
by leveraging anycast routing, which announces the same IP address(es) from multiple
distributed endpoints. BGP routing protocol selects a shortest Autonomous System (AS)
path to reach each advertised IP address block, and thus the end users located in di↵erent
areas will be directed to di↵erent topographically-closest locations via BGP routing.
Since anycast-based CDNs rely on the Internet routing protocols for request redirec-
tion, conceptually they are immune to redirection hijacking attacks. However, we observe
that in practice some anycast CDNs are also leveraging DNS-based mapping to improve
accuracy and performance, making themselves vulnerable to request routing manipulation.
CDNs may leverage anycast in di↵erent strategies: anycasting nameservers, or any-
casting web servers, or both. Note that our study only involves the way that a CDN
directs users to web servers. Specifically, anycasting nameservers means that clients will
connect the nameservers via their anycast addresses, but does not a↵ect the process of
end-user redirection. In particular, if a CDN utilizes anycast DNS but still uses DNS-based
redirection, it will also be vulnerable to redirection hijacking attacks.
4.2 Threat Model
4.2.1 Attacker Model
The key feature of a redirection hijacking attack is that an adversary can inject crafted but
legitimate records to a recursive DNS resolver to manipulate the dynamic mapping inside
CDNs. We assume that the adversary is capable of bypassing the challenge-response
mechanism and injecting records into DNS caches, regardless if DNSSEC is used since
DNSSEC itself is vulnerable to replay attack. Specifically, the o↵-path adversaries can
guess the authentication parameters (i.e., source port number and TXIDs) e↵ectively by
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applying di↵erent techniques (e.g., fragmentation attacks [71, 112] or socket overloading
[72]) against the insu cient randomization or vulnerable implementations [70], to launch
the record injections remotely and a↵ect a large number of recursive DNS resolvers. It is
an ideal scenario that adversaries is on-path and can easily bypass the countermeasures of
randomization by sni ng the network packets and observing those parameters. However,
such an on-path condition is not required. We assume that adversaries are commonly
o↵-path and can launch a redirection hijacking attack in a highly remote and distributed
manner.
Note that recent work [82] has demonstrated that more than 92% of current DNS
platforms on the Internet are still vulnerable to record injection; even the popular public
DNS platforms are vulnerable to the indirect injection, in which a poisonous record is
injected in advance and becomes e↵ective after some other records expires. Within CDNs,
we assume that adversaries do not have to harvest the surrogate servers [118, 49] or
profile CDN’s mapping algorithm; they only need to use several selective mapping records
to override the CDN’s server selection.
4.2.2 Redirection Hijacking Attack
In comparison to the normal operations of a DNS-based mapping system in CDN, Figure
4.1 illustrates how a redirection hijacking attack works: an adversary exploits the dynamic
end-user mapping to manipulate an end-user’s access to edge networks. Normally, the
Content Provider delegates its name resolution to the CDN vendor’s mapping system,
typically via either CNAME redirection as shown in Figure 4.1 or directly hosting the NS
records in CDNs. When a client’s request for a content object is redirected into a CDN’s
nameserver, the mapping component examines the incoming queries (e.g., the client’s IP
prefix in ECS), performs real-time topological mapping based on network measurements,
and returns an optimized assignment that directs the client to a close, responsive edge
server [52].
Since the dynamic mapping between end-users and edge servers makes it impractical to
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of a Redirection Hijacking Attack
pre-sign a mapping record with traditional RSA-based DNSSEC, we assume that ECDSA
is used as the alternative solution to provide on-demand signatures for those dynamically
generated records in CDNs. However, even the mapping records with ECDSA signatures
are still vulnerable to message replay attacks. This is because (1) in operational practices,
the validity period of a DNSSEC signature (including ECDSA) should be long enough2 to
enable easy administration and avoid query load peaks (see §4.4.1 in RFC 6781 [83]) and
(2) the validation of DNSSEC signature cannot detect if a message is forwarded or replayed
to a di↵erent recipient by a third party. An adversary can simply fetch a legitimately signed
mapping record that was used or is being used for a di↵erent client’s network and inject it
into the resolver’s cache. Because the injected record, which is generated by a legitimate
authoritative nameserver but for a di↵erent group of clients, carries a valid signature,
the resolver will accept it for caching after a successful signature validation. Once the
injected record is accepted, the client requests will be redirected to a non-optimal edge
server chosen by the adversary, typically heavily loaded and geographically distant from
the clients, or even an unresponsive edge server to interrupt the client accesses to the
service hosted by CDNs.
We further note that such an attack can be successful even under the environments with
2Cloudflare’s ECDSA-based signatures are with the validity period of two days. The expiration
time of traditional RSA-based DNSSEC signature in practice is normally set to one month [83].
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strong security settings. Due to the nature of replay attacks in the redirection hijacking,
neither the client end nor resolver signature validations can detect the manipulation.
4.3 Attack Assessment
To assess the magnitude of redirection hijacking attacks in CDNs, we present the charac-
terization of CDN’s request routing and conduct a detailed threat analysis to demonstrate
the vulnerability of DNS-based CDNs to the malicious manipulation of end-user redirec-
tion even with DNSSEC protection. Then, we investigate the practical impacts, such as
performance degradation and caching popularity, and explore the more serious threats
posed by the redirection hijacking, which nullify CDN’s load balancing and DoS protec-
tion.
4.3.1 Methodology
In order to identify the CDN platforms that are vulnerable to redirection hijacking, we
measure the popular commercial CDNs across the Internet to characterize their configu-
rations and operations. To do so, we set up a group of geographically distributed van-
tage points on the machines in di↵erent Amazon EC2 regions (us-east-1, us-west-2, ap-
northeast-1, ap-southeast-2, ap-south-1, eu-central-1, eu-west-1, and sa-east-1, as shown
in Figure 4.2) to retrieve the DNS resolution results for customer websites hosted in each
CDN provider. Then, we examine the strategies of request routing and analyze the prac-
tical impacts, including the more serious threats than performance degradation.
More specifically, we empirically investigate the patterns of content delivery for CDN
vendors by taking the steps as follows:
• First, we simply search the o cial blog articles, technical documents, and announce-
ments published by each CDN vendor, as well as the external technical blogs,3, to
3For example https://www.cdnplanet.com/blog/which-cdns-support-edns-client-subne
t/ and https://www.cdnoverview.com.
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Figure 4.2: Vantage Points for Resolution
learn the details of content delivery mechanisms.
• We then verify our findings by studying DNS configurations and resolution results
from distributed vantage points for a list of customers of each CDN provider, which
are gathered by available utilities4 and the customer list/case studies presented in
CDN’s websites. For example, an identical A RRset should be fetched from di↵erent
locations when global anycast routing is utilized, and diverse A RRsets would be
observed when DNS-based dynamic mapping is used.
• Finally, we crosscheck the domain/host names and IP addresses obtained from the
DNS resolution by retrieving their information from publicly available passive DNS
databases5 to validate the resolution results.
4.3.2 Characterization Overview
Request routing in CDNs mainly consists of two consecutive steps:6 domain delegation and
surrogate selection. In the domain delegation, the Content Providers (CPs) delegate the
domain resolution to CDN vendors. In the surrogate selection, CDNs redirect a client’s
4For example https://trends.builtwith.com/cdns and https://wappalyzer.com/categorie
s/cdn.
5https://www.bfk.de/bfk_dnslogger_en and https://www.virustotal.com.
6The higher level techniques of request routing [45] such as application-level request routing
are only suitable for large file delivery due to extra latency [52], and thus we only consider those
techniques when discussing countermeasures (see Section 4.4.4).
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request to a proximal edge server. In essence, these two steps determine how CDNs
enable their service infrastructures to be located and accessed by end users. Since CDNs
have di↵erent ways to perform domain delegation and surrogate selection, we characterize
CDNs’ request routing with respect to their two redirection steps. Table 4.1 summarizes
the request routing and DNSSEC provision in popular CDN vendors.
Table 4.1: Characterization of CDNs’ Request Routing and DNSSEC Provision. The “ ”
indicates that adversaries may be able to manipulate the end-user redirection that results
in more serious damage. The “#” indicates that the record su↵ers from limited form of
dynamic vulnerability that may not cause serious threats such as service interruption.
CDN Domain Delegation Surrogate Selection
DNSSEC Dynamics
A CNAME A
Akamai CNAME Chain DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
Cachefly CNAME/NS Hosting Anycast Routing Feasible
CDN.net CNAME DNS Mapping ⇥  
CDN77 CNAME DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
CDNetworks CNAME DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
CDNlion CNAME DNS Mapping ⇥  
CDNsun CNAME DNS Mapping ⇥  
ChinaCache CNAME/CNAME Chain DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
CloudFlare CNAME/NS Hosting Anycast Routing X
CloudFront (Amazon) CNAME/NS Hosting DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
EdgeCast (Verizon) CNAME/CNAME Chain Hybrid Type I Feasible #
Fastly CNAME Hybrid Type II ⇥  
Highwinds CNAME Anycast Routing Feasible
Incapsula CNAME Hybrid Type I Feasible #
KeyCDN CNAME Chain DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥   
LeaseWeb CNAME DNS Mapping ⇥  
Limelight CNAME DNS Mapping ⇥  
MaxCDN/NetDNA CNAME Anycast Routing Feasible
Rackspace CNAME Chain DNS Mapping (ECS) ⇥  
cedexis (MultiCDN) CNAME Chain N/A ⇥  
Domain Delegation. The domain delegation is used to forward each client’s request
from the origin of Content Providers (CPs) to a CDN’s platform. The most common
domain delegation mechanisms are CNAME redirection and NS hosting.
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• CNAME Redirection: The CNAME record enables a domain name to be resolved
via an alias. By pointing a CP’s domain to a domain provisioned by CDN via
CNAME, a client’s request will subsequently be redirected to a CDN’s domain name
and resolved by the CDN’s nameservers.
• NS Hosting: An alternative approach of domain delegation is to designate CDN-
provided authoritative nameservers in NS records of a DNS referral response, which
is generated by the CP’s authoritative nameservers and then is received by clients.
Consequently, the DNS resolution of the CP’s domain will be fully operated by CDN.
From Table 4.1, we can see that all CDN vendors provide CNAME redirection to enable
the CPs to delegate their DNS resolution to CDNs. By contrast, only three CDN vendors
also support NS hosting for domain delegation. Given the prevalent use of CNAME in
CDNs, however, we note that the integrity of CNAME records has been widely disregarded
on the Internet. This is because (1) typically, the first-level front-end CNAME redirec-
tion occurs at the CP’s authoritative DNS infrastructure, which is mainly out of control
of CDNs, (2) the CP’s authoritative nameservers lack of motivations to sign CNAME
records, due to the dynamic mapping in the following surrogate selection, (3) in some
cases, dynamic CNAME mapping exists in CDN’s platforms (see Section 4.3.1), and (4)
many CDN providers leverage multiple CNAME records (i.e., CNAME chain in Table
4.1) to facilitate their platform management (e.g., enabling customers to employ di↵er-
ent services by being mapped to di↵erent CNAMEs), which causes that traversing signed
CNAME records are significantly expensive for recursively validating DNSSEC signature
for each CNAME record. We will discuss the technique of “CNAME Flattening” in Section
4.4.3 to mitigate the security threat of CNAME in CDNs.
Surrogate Selection. The surrogate selection falls into two fundamental approaches:
DNS-based and anycast-based. Table 4.1 shows that the DNS-based mapping is still dom-
inant in CDNs and ECS has been widely supported, especially for those vendors operating
a large-scale infrastructure, such as Akamai and Amazon. However, more recent vendors
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are more likely to build their platforms with anycast routing to leverage its easy and ro-
bust deployment. We also observe that some CDN vendors have employed the di↵erent
hybrid system design by leveraging both DNS-based mapping and anycast routing to im-
prove the performance of their global content deliveries. In the following, we will elaborate
on those di↵erent patterns for the operations of CDNs’ request routing and analyze the
security threat of redirection hijacking caused by the dynamic surrogate selection and the
ine↵ectiveness of DNSSEC via case studies.
4.3.3 Threat Analysis
4.3.3.1 DNSSEC (Live Signing) is NOT a Solution: Case Studies
DNSSEC is proposed as a foundational system-wide solution to DNS vulnerabilities, es-
pecially for the record injection by MitM attacks. Here we depict detailed case studies
to analyze the vulnerability under di↵erent CDN deployment patterns. We demonstrate
the infeasibility of providing pre-computed DNSSEC signatures in the dynamic context of
DNS-based CDNs. As we discussed in Section 4.1.3, the root cause is that the traditional
RSA-based signature algorithm cannot achieve on-demand signature in real-time due to
its high computational cost.
Subsequently, for the case studies, we also examine the scenarios when all necessary
signature operations can be e ciently performed. To do so, we assume that (1) the
CNAME records would be secured by adding corresponding signatures, and (2) CDNs are
able to generate on-demand DNSSEC signatures to sign the dynamic mapping records
e ciently, such as the ECDSA-based implementation that has been used in CloudFlare’s
platform [10].
Case Study of End-User Mapping: Akamai. Exemplified by Akamai, Figure 4.3
shows a typical resolution chain by CNAME redirection and the end-user mapping system
rolled-out by ECS [52]. Specifically, the domain of the content provider is first translated to
a domain provisioned by Akamai’s CDN via CNAME. Afterwards, the CDN’s nameservers
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take over the resolution and finally an A record is dynamically generated by the end-
user mapping subsystem to assign an edge server with optimized performance such as
responsiveness and capacity, based on the location estimation of the end-user’s IP address
carried in ECS extension.
Due to the diversity of mapping records and more than 216,000 servers within more
than 1,500 networks in Akamai’s CDN,7 it is ine cient and impractical to predetermine
or predict the server assignment for each customer and provide a pre-computed DNSSEC
signature, resulting in the fundamental vulnerability to record injection attacks. An ad-
versary is able to exploit this vulnerability to hijack redirection and mislead end users to a
di↵erent domain controlled by the adversary. We note that such a threat can be mitigated
by employing ECDSA-based signature, as ECDSA is capable of dynamically signing the
records. However, given the adoption of ECDSA, the dynamic mapping is still vulnerable
to the redirection hijacking attack as mentioned in Section 3.2.
www.dell.com. 3600 IN CNAME www1.dell-cidr.akadns.net.
www1.dell-cidr.akadns.net 3600 IN CNAME cdn-www.dell.com.edgekey.net.
cdn-www.dell.com.edgekey.net. 21600 IN CNAME cdn-www.dell.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.
akadns.net.
cdn-www.dell.com.edgekey.net. 3600 IN CNAME e28.x.akamaiedge.net.
globalredir.akadns.net.
e28.x.akamaiedge.net. 20 IN A 104.117.80.33
Figure 4.3: An Example of DNS-based End-User Redirection by CNAME (Akamai)
It is worth noting that, including Akamai, some DNS-based CDN vendors also provide
DNS-hosting services with anycast routing and optional DNSSEC signature (e.g., Akamai’s
Fast DNS8). However, this type of service aims to protect the DNS infrastructure itself
only; if a customer enables the content delivery, dynamic A records are still used to direct
end users to edge servers and thus cannot be protected by DNSSEC.
Case Study of Anycast: CloudFlare. Anycast announces the same IP address(es)
from multiple locations and relies on the BGP routing protocols to perform the front-end
7www.akamai.com/us/en/about/facts-figures.jsp.
8www.akamai.com/us/en/solutions/products/cloud-security/fast-dns.jsp.
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redirection. Therefore, the content providers leveraging anycast-based CDNs would have
identical A record(s), which are static, and thus the anycast-based CDNs are able to secure
the integrity of RRsets with either ECDSA-based or pre-computed RSA-based signatures.
This makes the anycast-based CDNs immune to redirection hijacking.
The examples below show the configurations of CloudFlare with the domain delegation
of CNAME and NS hosting, respectively. In both cases, the returned signed A records are
with the global anycast addresses, and so there is no risk of redirection hijacking. However,
we also note that although the Content Provider enables DNSSEC in the CloudFlare’s
CDN, the integrity of its CNAME record has been disregarded, which still leads to the
risk of domain hijacking.
$ DNS resolution for domain using NS Hosting
filippo.io. NS beth.ns.cloudflare.com.
filippo.io. NS jim.ns.cloudflare.com.
filippo.io. DS ...
filippo.io. RRSIG DS [ECDSA signature]
blog.filippo.io. A 104.20.145.15
blog.filippo.io. A 104.20.144.15
blog.filippo.io. RRSIG A [ECDSA signature]
$ DNS resolution for domain using CNAME
www.martindale.com. CNAME www.martindale.com.cdn.cloudflare.net.
www.martindale.com.cdn.cloudflare.net . A 104.18.60.26
www.martindale.com.cdn.cloudflare.net. A 104.18.61.26
www.martindale.com.cdn.cloudflare.net. RRSIG A [ECDSA signature]
Note that ECDSA provides CloudFlare the solution to sign their records “on-the-fly” at
the edge, but its invulnerability to the end-user manipulation is mainly due to anycast
routing rather than ECDSA signing.
Case Study of Hybrid Type I – Regional Anycast: Incapsula. Incapsula en-
ables a hybrid strategy for the request routing, where the DNS-based mapping is used to
preliminarily determine the geographic area of end users and a regional anycast address is
used to serve a specific region. That is, using the regional anycast, a world-wide network
is divided into di↵erent regions (typically 5-7 regions based on the continents), and within
each region, identical anycast addresses are advertised and used to direct end users in this
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of Redirection Hijacking with Regional Anycast
region to a close PoP (Point-of-Presence).
On one hand, such a type of hybrid strategy mostly leverages the anycast routing and
is able to use DNSSEC to secure the certain number of static DNS records within each
region. On the other hand, it still introduces the dynamic DNS records as DNS-based
mapping is used, and thus it is vulnerable to the redirection hijacking for maneuvering
the end-user access. Figure 4.4 illustrates an example of a global network using regional
anycast and its susceptibility to redirection-hijacking. Even with the adoption of DNSSEC,
similar to the case of DNS-based redirection, an adversary can inject a legitimate anycast
record associated with the end users from a di↵erent region, directing the victim users to
the edge servers that serve the clients in another continent.
Case Study of Hybrid Type II – Separate Anycast/Unicast: Fastly. Instead of
adding the ECS support, Fastly addresses the problem of location discrepancy in a di↵erent
hybrid strategy: (1) in a normal case, the traditional NS-based mapping is utilized to direct
end users to close PoPs; (2) anycast addresses are used to answer the queries from public
DNS resolvers. Under such a strategy, the end users behind ISPs leveraging centralized
DNS infrastructures will still su↵er from the problem of location discrepancy. Moreover,
those clients that do not use public DNS services are vulnerable to redirection hijacking,
as in the case of DNS-based mapping.
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Case Study of Dynamic CNAME: KeyCDN. Unlike other DNS-based CDNs, Key-
CDN leverages CNAME to map the CP’s domain to a close PoP first, and then assign an
appropriate edge server within the PoP via A records.
$ DNS resolution from us-east
ja.onsen.io. CNAME jaonsenio-4ecf.kxcdn.com.
jaonsenio-4ecf.kxcdn.com. CNAME p-usse00.kxcdn.com.
p-usse00.kxcdn.com. A 76.164.234.2
$ DNS resolution from us-west
ja.onsen.io. CNAME jaonsenio-4ecf.kxcdn.com.
jaonsenio-4ecf.kxcdn.com. CNAME p-uswd00.kxcdn.com.
p-uswd00.kxcdn.com. A 107.182.231.101
The dynamic CNAME mapping introduces another potential attack vector for redirec-
tion hijacking via CNAME record. Similar to hijacking a dynamic A record, an adversary
could inject a legitimate CNAME record associated with a remote non-optimal PoP to de-
grade the user-perceived performance, even under the availability of DNSSEC live signing
enabled by ECDSA.
On the other hand, with the usage of ECDSA, the redirection hijacking for dynamic A
records would not cause significant performance degradation because all valid A records are
being mapped to the IP addresses within the nearby PoP assigned by CNAME. However,
the adversaries can still leverage legitimate records to redirect users to the IP addresses
of unresponsive edge servers within PoP to nullify the DoS protection and interrupt the
end-user accesses for the victim service.
Case Study of Multiple-CDN Deployment: cedexis. We then investigate the
deployment with multiple CDN providers (a.k.a. CDN Brokers [95, 96]). A typical de-
ployment pattern of multiple CDNs leverages Global Tra c Management (GTM) as the
first-level redirection, where the GTM platform directs end users to a selected appropriate
CDN provider:
$ DNS resolution from us-east
www.lequipe.fr. CNAME 2-01-273c-0023.cdx.cedexis.net.
2-01-273c-0023.cdx.cedexis.net. CNAME lequipe-fr.lequipe.netdna-cdn.com.
lequipe-fr.lequipe.netdna-cdn.com. A 94.31.29.248
CHAPTER 4. REDIRECTION HIJACKING IN CDNS 72
$ DNS resolution from ap-northeast
www.lequipe.fr. CNAME 2-01-273c-0023.cdx.cedexis.net.
2-01-273c-0023.cdx.cedexis.net. CNAME www.lequipe.fr.edgekey.net.
www.lequipe.fr.edgekey.net. CNAME e7130.g.akamaiedge.net.
e7130.g.akamaiedge.net. A 104.116.83.6
In the example above, the cedexis’s GTM platform9 is responsible for choosing an
appropriate CDN vendor according to the location of a client and the real-time perfor-
mance of CDNs in this area. First, under such a deployment, the diversity of A records
depends on the strategy of each CDN’s request routing. The clients accessing the website
via NetDNA would not be vulnerable to redirection hijacking for A records, due to the use
of global anycast (assuming signed anycast A records), but the clients directed by Akamai
will su↵er the risk of hijacked redirection mappings.
Since the selection of CDN providers is performed via CNAME redirection, it in-
troduces dynamic CNAME mappings. Thus, DNSSEC live signing cannot prevent the
redirection-hijacking attacks, in which legitimate records are injected to redirect users to
arbitrary non-optimal CDN providers, nullifying performance improvements o↵ered by
both GTM and CDN platforms.
Summary. The vulnerability of CDNs to redirection hijacking stems from the dy-
namic characteristics of DNS records used for the request routing, which gives adversaries
a chance to maneuver CDN’s user redirection by injecting crafted but legitimate DNS
records. We summarize the features of dynamic mapping for CNAME and A records in
Table 4.1, respectively. The DNS-based CDNs are widely vulnerable to redirection hijack-
ing, but the CDNs using global anycast for the request routing are immune to redirection
hijacking, due to the static mapping of DNS records. Specifically, CloudFlare is the only
CDN vendor providing DNSSEC signatures for A records to its customers, by leveraging
its global anycast routing and ECDSA-based DNSSEC implementation. Also, we con-
sider other CDN vendors with anycast routing of being capable of supporting DNSSEC
signatures without DNS dynamics, labeled as “Feasible” in Table 4.1.
9https://www.cedexis.com/.
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Figure 4.5: TTL
Note that the DNSSEC provision summarized in Table 4.1 involves only the capacity
of signing the CDN-issued records for the request routing; the CPs may still be able to
sign their records for origin sites, but the request routing would not be protected by their
signatures since the mapping records will be provided by CDNs. We argue that this has
been a foundational obstacle for the DNSSEC adoption on the Internet, especially for the
top websites leveraging CDNs to provide worldwide services.
4.3.3.2 TTL
We list the TTL values of the DNS records for surrogate assignment in Figure 4.5. The
DNS-based CDNs use shorter TTL values in their dynamic A records for fast tra c redi-
rection and load balancing, typically less than 300 seconds. Most of anycast CDNs have
the TTL values of A records at 300 seconds, while Edgecast has a larger value at one hour
and Incapsula leverages a very short value at 30 seconds.
The length of TTL in a normal DNS record has a significant impact on the possibility
of DNS poisoning, because the short TTLs force the recursive resolver to more frequently
perform DNS lookups, which grants adversaries more chances (i.e., more frequent “win-
dows of opportunity”) to perform the record injections [77]. With DNSSEC enabled, we
will craft records based on the legitimate records with valid signatures that are re-used
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or replayed. Thus, the prevalent use of short TTL values in normal DNS records indeed
increases the possibility of injecting replayed records.
Passive Analysis is NOT e↵ective. Since CDNs typically utilize short TTL values
in dynamic mapping records and adversaries usually intend to use larger TTLs in injected
records to cause more damage, intuitively, a dynamic record with large TTL value may
indicate that it is highly likely to be a crafted mapping. However, popular large-scale
passive DNS databases do not enable their sensor servers to capture the TTL information
in the traces so that such a manipulation might not be detected via passive DNS databases.
4.3.3.3 Performance Impact
We analyze the performance impact caused by redirection hijacking, in which adversaries
inject the records to deliberately direct end users to a geographically distant non-optimal
site.
Performance matters. User experience is extremely important to the business of
CPs, especially eCommerce sites [52, 7]. Thus, the performance benefits provided by
CDNs become critical to the CPs. A prior work [37] observes that even little di↵erence in
CDN’s performance could cause significant financial gain/loss.
Performance metrics. Similar to the study [52], we measure the following metrics to
characterize the potential performance impact when an end user is diverted from optimal
edge servers by redirection hijacking.
• Round-Trip-Time (RTT): the RTT measures the propagation delay when the packets
traverse the networks, which indicates the quality of the selected network path and
is significantly dominated by the distance between two endpoints.
• Time-to-First-Byte (TTFB): the TTFB measures the amount of time between when
the first byte of requested content is received and when the client issues the request.
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Figure 4.6: CDF for the Round-Trip Time
• Content Download Speed: unlike [52] measuring the page download time, we use
the download speed measured by the curl utility because the curl does not support
concurrent connections for embedded contents.
Methodology. We leverage the DNS records obtained via the probes from distributed
Amazon regions, as shown in Figure 4.2, and use the same technique for launching a cache
penetrating attack presented in [118], where the curl utility is used to bypass CDN’s
server assignment by replacing the normal host header with a (distant) non-optimal IP
address in HTTP request. A recent work [53] verifies that such a technique still works
for all CDNs in their study. For example, to fetch a content object from an edge server
located in Asia as the representation of end users in east coast of Unite States, we issue
the following request at a host in the Amazon region of us-east-1:
curl -H Host:i.dell.com -O http://104.78.87.26/sites/imagecontent/products
/...inspiron-15-7000-gaming-pdp-polaris-01.jpg
Our experiments are performed based on Akamai’s CDN platforms. We manually
obtain a list of content objects from popular CDN-hosted sites (dell.com, apple.com, and
walmart.com), including static web pages (.html and .css), dynamically generated web pages
(embedded search keywords in URLs), images, documents, and medium-sized download
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Figure 4.7: CDF for the TTFB
files, with a variety of sizes from 500K to 50M. We download those web contents by
using the curl utility to evaluate the performance impact experienced by end users under
redirection hijacking.
For each metric presented above, we report the measured results associated with the
optimal surrogate assignment and the redirected non-optimal surrogates, respectively. In
addition, we identify a redirected site with the most significant performance degradation
for each vantage point, and plot it as the worst case in Figures 4.6 - 4.8.
Round-Trip-Time. RTT is a purely underlying network latency and the most simple
and straightforward performance metric of a network connection and user experience.
Figure 4.6 shows that for the optimal assignment of the CDN’s mapping system, the RTTs
are mostly less than 30ms; but the hijacked redirections typically significantly increase the
RTT latency to around 300ms, and in the worst case, the RTTs are increased to around
350 - 450ms.
Time-to-First-Byte. Since TTFB involves both the network latency and the aspects
that are not a↵ected by the mapping decisions, such as the construction and compression
of a web page, we only include the measured results for web pages. Figure 4.7 illustrates
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similar impacts of TTFB in comparison to RTT. Note that our results show lower TTFBs
than the results reported in [52], probably due to less dynamics of the web pages we
requested.
Download Speed. Figure 4.8 shows the measured speeds for the file downloads. The
results from optimal mapping decisions vary, but the cases under redirection hijacking
show a significant decrease in their file download performance.
4.3.3.4 Scope of Impact
As discussed before, both the CNAME and A records for the CDN’s request routing could
be exploited by redirection hijacking. We then study whether hijacking a single record can
cause collateral damage for other domains. Table 4.2 summarizes the scope of impact for
those CDNs vulnerable to redirection hijacking. If CNAME records are unsigned, hijacking
a CNAME record itself will just a↵ect the domain associated with this record in all cases,
since in these CDNs there is no canonical name being reused among CPs. In other words,
there is no shared name appeared in the “left-side” of a CNAME record. However, if
CNAME could be signed, only KeyCDN’s dynamic CNAME poses the threat of hijacking
a single domain. Meanwhile, in some CDNs there could be multiple (sub)domains being
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mapped to the same CNAME alias, i.e., a shared name appears in the “left-side” of an
A record, and thus hijacking such A records would have collateral damages for those “co-
resident” (sub)domains.
4.3.3.5 Domain Sharding
The domain sharding (or content segregation) [2] technique is typically used to increase
the amount of simultaneous connections by utilizing multiple domains. For example,
www.dell.com is directed to e28.x.akamaiedge.net but all embedded images are served via
i.dell.com, which is directed to e28.g.akamaiedge.net. Although this technique also distributes
the connections to di↵erent domains among multiple edge servers, in such a case poisoning
a portal domain (i.e., www.dell.com) is su cient to a↵ect the accessibility of most end
users.10
4.3.3.6 Impact of CDN Caching
In addition to the issues discussed above, we are aware of that redirection hijacking may
also have a subtle impact upon the caching system of CDNs. The caching system is the
important building block of a CDN’s infrastructure, providing accelerated access for static
and popular contents. The cache hit ratio is a critical metric to CDN’s performance, since
a cache miss may cause extra latency for fetching the requested content from a remote
origin server, as well as induce more network tra c and server workload.
The popularity of requested contents on the Internet shows a strong localization. In
other words, the redirected end-user groups may be highly likely to have totally di↵erent
interests on the web contents. Thus, the manipulated redirection would cause the previ-
ously cached contents to be rapidly expelled and the limited caches at edge server to be
frequently updated, consequently resulting in much degraded performance and user expe-
rience. Also, the decreased cache hit ratio will significantly increase the bandwidth costs
10Note that the domain sharding would become unnecessary under the adoption of HTTP/2
(SPDY) that supports concurrent requests.
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Table 4.2: Impact of a single record hijacking (CDNs with global anycast that are invulnerable
to the redirection hijacking have been excluded.)
CDN
CNAME A (signed)
Single
Domain
(unsigned)
Single
Domain
(signed)
Single
Domain
Multiple
Domain
Akamai X X
CDN.net X X
CDN77 X X
CDNetwork X X
CDNlion X X
CDNsun X X
ChinaCache X X X
CloudFront (Amazon) X X
EdgeCast (Verizon) X X X
Fastly X X X
Incapsula X X
KeyCDN X X X X
LeaseWeb X X
Limelight X X X
Rackspace X X
of CPs for delivering contents to numerous clients [23]. Finally, the increased back-end
connections to origin servers for fetching requested contents will further slow down servers’
responsiveness.
4.3.4 More Serious Threats
We further explore the more serious threats of redirection hijacking for maneuvering the
end-user’s access in CDNs. Technically, CDNs have natural capability to absorb and
di↵use attack tra c with the geographically distributed edge networks, and thus become
an ideal infrastructure to integrate the enhanced security mechanisms, where the edge
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servers can (1) act as reverse proxies to inspect incoming tra c and apply the rules of
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to filter out malicious tra c and (2) perform the
load balancing and DoS protection by diverting users from overwhelmed edge servers via
DNS-based dynamic mapping or anycast routing.
Adversaries could exploit redirection hijacking to launch a (parts of) DoS attack by
directing the requests from a large number of clients to a single IP address of the victim
edge server. The WAFs cannot discard those legitimate tra c from real end users. By
selectively injecting the DNS records associated with di↵erent popular contents, more
clients are connecting to the victim edge server, and then the server has to maintain more
back-end connections to di↵erent origin servers to fetch the contents. However, the cached
contents are quickly being replaced, due to high volume of tra c for massive popular
contents. Sooner or later, the victim edge server become overloaded and unresponsive to
client requests. More importantly, the load balancing cannot appropriately distribute the
tra c since the clients are bypassing the mapping system, and subsequently all the clients
that are redirected to those overloaded edge servers will not be able to access the contents
or services hosted in CDNs anymore.
Furthermore, the adversaries can leverage the system failure or outage to significantly
amplify their attacks. For example, we sent the ping probes to monitor the liveness of
edge servers for two weeks whose IP addresses have been obtained from our experiments
for DNS resolution presented in Section 4.1. We found that 4.5% of IP addresses become
unresponsive during the tests, around half of which do not come back online by the end of
our experiments. With the easy detection for unresponsive edge servers, the adversaries do
not have to perform the actual DoS attack and can simply interrupt end users’ accessibility
by replaying legitimate mapping records associated with those unresponsive edge servers
to resolvers.
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4.4 Countermeasures
In this section, we discuss the practical factors a↵ecting the vulnerability and the coun-
termeasures for detecting or mitigating the redirection hijacking attacks.
4.4.1 ECS Considerations
The introduction of EDNS-Client-Subnet provides DNS-based CDNs an attractive scheme
to improve the accuracy of their mapping systems and the user-perceived performance for
clients using public DNS or the resolvers distant from their locations. As mentioned before,
the presence or absence of ECS option does not a↵ect the vulnerability we studied in this
chapter. The standardized document [57] does not discuss the di culty of signing the
dynamic mapping records. Also, according to the document, the EDNS0 extension does
not change the behavior of data authentication, i.e., the ECS data will not be signed by
DNSSEC.
On the other hand, ECS indeed provides another attack vector for DNS abuse. For
example, the scope netmask carried in ECS indicates the specific IP block associated with
a reply. An adversary may be able to selectively poison a resolver’s cache to only impact
a specific IP range [81], via a fraudulent record directing clients to a malicious address.
However, such an activity can be detected if the record is signed by DNSSEC (assuming
that either ECDSA is used or only a limited number of mapping records exist so that the
signatures can be pre-computed). Furthermore, if adversaries exploit redirection hijacking
to maneuver the end-user mapping for tussling CDN’s performance or interrupting a
service, they could arbitrarily designate the ECS data to impact more clients by using a
less detailed network prefix.
Countermeasures. As discussed in Section 4.3, the root cause that even the DNSSEC
with live-signing is not e↵ective against redirection hijacking, lies in that the resolvers
cannot detect a legitimate but replayed mapping that is supposedly used for a di↵erent
group of clients. Thus, considering the ECS enabled, one potential mitigation is to include
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the ECS data in DNSSEC when signing the RRsets. With ECDSA, the records generated
by the end-user mapping can be dynamically signed on demand. Although signing a
dynamic record by ECDSA still su↵ers from the mapping manipulation, due to the ECS
data being signed, the resolvers can validate the integrity of the end-user mapping. In
other words, adversaries cannot craft a valid record to manipulate the end-user mapping
anymore. This is because the signed ECS can guarantee that the data field (i.e., IP
addresses) is assigned to the specified user group (ECS data), which eliminates the risk of
obscuring the mapping between end users and edge servers.
Limitations. ECS is suggested to be enabled only when clear advantages can be
seen by resolvers [57], e.g., open DNS resolvers or a centralized DNS infrastructure serv-
ing clients from a variety of geographically distributed networks. Meanwhile, in current
practice, CDN vendors typically enable ECS by whitelisting the resolvers that explicitly
support ECS, and vice versa. Thus, as only limited adoption of ECS can be expected,
signing the RRsets with ECS just authenticates the records in the resolvers that enable
ECS.
4.4.2 DNSSEC Considerations
The inclusion of ECS extension as additional information when signing a record with
DNSSEC provides an e↵ective countermeasure against the record replay in redirection
hijacking, but its e↵ectiveness is limited by the deployment of ECS. Inspired by this, we
then consider a more general scheme that leverages existing additional data elements in
DNSSEC.
Note that adversaries cannot generate a valid signature since they are unable to obtain
the private key. Moreover, the replay attack of redirection hijacking can be successful
because the validity period of DNSSEC signatures is typically long enough to be reused
by adversaries to launch the record injection. However, only using a much shorter validity
period is not su cient since the signature inception and expiration could also be fabricated
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by adversaries. Consequently, we consider that one possible mitigation is to secure the
validity period by including additional timestamp information when signing a record.
Combined with a short validity period in RRSIG (e.g., only slightly longer than the TTL
of mapping records), this would significantly increase the di culty of record injection as
the validity period cannot be altered and adversaries only have a short time window to
perform the record injection.
Therefore, a straightforward approach is to include the validity period (i.e., signature
expiration) when signing a record. However, since the validity period is associated with
the RRSIG record rather than the record being signed, it breaks the normal operations
of signing a record (but in a harmless manner): the inception and expiration timestamp
will be generate first, and then the signature of RRSIG is computed according to both
the responded RRset and the validity period associated with the RRSIG record itself.
Correspondingly, the resolver’s software needs to be modified to include the expiration
when computing the message digest. An alternative approach is to define a new extension
representing the validity period in the additional section of DNS messages and sign the
RRsets, including such extension data.
Note that the mechanisms we discussed here have the similarities to TSIG/SIG(0) [98,
59], which sign complete DNS request/response with timestamps. However, TSIG requires
a symmetric key and thus is most commonly used for authorizing dynamic updates and
zone transfers. The SIG(0)’s functionality has been fundamentally replaced by DNSSEC.
We argue that it may be worth to enhance the operations of DNSSEC to mitigate the
threat of replay attacks under the prevalence of dynamic mapping in CDNs.
4.4.3 CNAME Flattening
One of foundational obstacles for CDN vendors to achieve the integrity of redirection
records is the prevalent use of CNAME records, especially the dynamic CNAME mapping
and chained CNAME records. A possible solution is to hide the CNAME chain from
resolvers and leave the CNAME traversing to CDN’s authoritative nameservers, i.e., the
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CNAME Flattening [11].11
The CNAME Flattening implemented by CloudFare was originally designed to enable
the CNAME at the root domain while complying RFC’s DNS specification [94], which
requires that there should be no other record types if the type of a record is CNAME. With
CNAME flattening, the CDN’s authoritative nameserver acts as a resolver by recursively
resolving the CNAME chain and finally constructs an A record to substitute the original
CNAME record.
We therefore suggest that the CNAME flattening should also be leveraged by CDNs for
security purposes. That is, instead of iteratively replying with multiple CNAME records,
the CDN’s authoritative nameserver takes the full responsibility of CNAME resolution,
typically within the CDN’s mapping infrastructure, and finally returns an A record, which
can be signed with DNSSEC (live signing). This significantly reduces the computational
overhead of signing CNAME records as well as the cost of multiple times of signature
validation.
Note that the CNAME flattening is mainly associated with the records for the redi-
rection operated by CDNs. The first level CNAME delegation occurs at the CP’s author-
itative nameservers, which may be out of control of CDNs. However, the CPs can easily
secure the CNAME redirections by enabling (traditional) DNSSEC signatures at their
authoritative nameservers, since those records are typically static mappings for domain
delegation. Also, when enabling the CNAME flattening in DNS-based CDNs, the CDN’s
authoritative nameservers may need to employ ECS when retrieving the mapping result
as the representation of client’s networks.
Overall, the CNAME flattening provides CDN vendors with a potential solution to
secure the CNAME records at an acceptable cost by avoiding iterative signature validation
for multiple CNAME records, while retaining the flexibility of using a CNAME chain to
facilitate the platform management.
11A similar functionality has also been implemented by DNS-hosting providers, such as the
ANAME record [15]. Here we focus on the discussion of such a feature provided by CDNs.
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4.4.4 Request Re-Mapping
In addition to performing the request routing via DNS or anycast, CDNs also leverage
the high-level re-mapping mechanism to remedy the non-optimal server assignment in
some cases. For example, when a request for content objects arrives at an edge server
assigned by the mapping system, the edge server first performs an RTT measurement to
the client. If the RTT is acceptable, the edge server immediately serves the content to
the client based on normal content retrieval strategies; otherwise, the edge server requires
the mapping system to reassign an optimal server and direct the client to the di↵erent
server (e.g., via HTTP status code 3xx for redirection). Due to the extra server selection
and redirection operations, the re-mapping introduces additional high latency penalty.
Moreover, it is worth to note that, with the wide support of ECS, the accuracy of DNS-
based mapping has been significantly improved for those clients impacted by the location
discrepancy of LDNSes. That is, the clients are rarely being assigned to a non-optimal
edge server. Thus, the request re-mapping is typically only suitable for large file transfer,
such as video streaming and software distribution [17, 52].
Nevertheless, CDNs can still enable their Real User Measurement (RUM) system to
monitor the performance from a large set of clients and aggregate the monitoring results
with geographic locality or client-LDNS pairing to recognize the group of clients a↵ected by
anomalous redirections. In general, a more fine-grained performance monitoring and more
active request re-mapping could be useful to mitigate serious performance degradation in
some cases. However, any high-level re-mapping mechanism still su↵ers from the threat of
nullifying load balancing and DoS mitigation when unresponsive edge servers are exploited
in redirection hijacking by adversaries, as discussed in Section 4.3.
4.4.5 DNS Encryption and Transport-layer DNS
DNSCurve [14] and DNSCrypt [13] use ECC to encrypt DNS packets. Google Public
DNS o↵ers DNS-over-HTTPS [22] interface to enable the DNS resolution over encrypted
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HTTPS connections. Subsequently, Connection-Oriented DNS (T-DNS) [129, 75] is pro-
posed to fundamentally address the weakness of DNS connectionless transmissions in
security and privacy. Unlike DNS-Crypt and DNSCurve leveraging the ECC, T-DNS is
established over the existing Transport-Layer Security (TLS) framework and is carefully
implemented to make the latency and resource needs induced by T-DNS manageable. Us-
ing TLS, the channels between stub and recursive resolvers, as well as between recursive
resolvers and authoritative servers, would be protected from eavesdropping and MitM
attacks.
It is clear that the encrypted DNS and transport-layer DNS indeed address most
security and privacy issues of DNS, including the vulnerability we presented in the chapter,
because adversaries would be unable to know the content of DNS queries. However, due
to high performance penalty and expensive cost for deployment, there is only very limited
adoption on the current Internet. Moreover, their negative impacts upon the scalability
of DNS, especially at the root and top-level domains, remains unclear.
4.5 Related Work
Disrupting CDN’s server assignment has been recently proposed to circumvent the Internet
censorship [74, 130], where arbitrary edge servers, rather than the optimal servers assigned
by the CDN’s mapping system, are used to bypass the DNS-based/IP-based censorship
and obtain the censored content. The focus of such censorship circumvention is to retrieve
the censored content from edge servers with acceptable performance. By contrast, we
explore the attack scenarios where an end-user’s access would be significantly degraded
or interrupted, resulting in potential financial losses for both CDN providers and content
providers.
DNS and CDN. The discrepancy of location proximity between end-users and their
LDNSes has been observed for more than a decade [110, 92]. Pang et al. [101] characterized
the responsiveness of DNS-based network controls according to the behaviors of end-
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systems and LDNSes. Huang et al. [76] proposed a solution called FQDN extension, where
the clients obtain a location-aware cluster identifier and add this identifier to hostnames, to
tackle the client-LDNS mismatch problem in Global Tra c Management (GTM). In order
to improve the e ciency of content delivery, Krishnamurthy et al. [84] proposed a method
by which the HTTP interactions are piggybacked on DNS responses. Krishnan et al. [85]
built a system to diagnose the inflated latencies using active measurements to improve
the e↵ectiveness of CDN’s indirection and user performance. Scott et al. [109] built a
tool chain for understanding the web deployment and footprints of CDNs by collecting
DNS resolution results and probing the IPv4 address space. In addition, Pearce et al.
[104] developed a tool to measure and study the global DNS manipulation in Internet
censorship.
Ager et al. [36] compared the local DNS resolvers against public DNS resolvers (Google
Public DNS and OpenDNS) to study the responsiveness and diversity of resolvers. Sub-
sequently, Otto et al. [97] examined the performance cost when clients use public DNS
services to access CDNs. With the emergence of EDNS-Client-Subnet, Streibelt et al.
[116] and Calder et al. [49] leveraged the ECS with specified client prefixes to infer and
profile the large-scale service infrastructure on the Internet such as Google. Kintis et al.
[81] investigated the potential privacy risk of ECS for surveillance, and revealed a cache
poisoning threat for highly selective group of clients.
Cache Poisoning and DNSSEC. Schomp et al. [108] assessed the vulnerabilities
of diverse record injection attacks, particularly Kaminsky’s attack and Bailiwick attack.
Duan et al. [63] proposed a “Hold-On” period before accepting a reply to mitigate the
DNS poisoning by allowing a legitimate reply to also arrive. Lian et al. [87] measured
the practical impact of DNSSEC deployment and found that DNSSEC-signed domains
may create collateral damage in the resolutions of valid domains. Shulman et al. [113]
developed a validation engine to identify vulnerable keys in DNSSEC-signed domains. Van
Rijswijk-Deij et al. [119, 120] studied the ECDSA deployment in CloudFlare and the .nl
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TLD, and examined the computational overhead induced by the validation of ECC-based
signatures. Yan et al. [128] proposed a revised DNSSEC signature that constructs a hash
chain to limit the replay vulnerability windows when the master server has failed. Their
study tackles the malicious slave servers and has a di↵erent scope than our study.
Recent studies revealed the pervasive mismanagement of DNSSEC. Shulman et al.
[113] developed a validation engine to identify vulnerable keys in DNSSEC-signed domains.
Chung et al. [55] performed a longitudinal measurement study into how well DNSSEC’s
PKI is managed.
Security Issues in CDN. Liang et al. [89] studied the practical impact of CDN’s
HTTPS deployment. Composing HTTPS with CDN introduces the complexity of authen-
tication delegation since CDN cuts the secure communication paths o↵ered by HTTPS.
Similarly, Wa¨hlisch et al. [124] investigated the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) deployment on the routing layer and reported that CDNs are the main cause
for the insu ciency of RPKI deployment. While the focus of these work is on the vulner-
ability of CDN’s backend, our study explores the issue of the frontend of CDN’s service
delivery.
Chen et al. [53] presented the forwarding-loop attacks, where malicious customers may
be capable of creating the forwarding loops inside one CDN or across multiple CDNs to
launch potential DoS attacks. The root cause of this threat is that CDNs lack the control
over customers’ (mis)configurations. Vissers et al. [123] studied the “origin-exposing”
attacks to identify the address of a service origin and bypass the cloud-based security
infrastructure, typically provided by CDNs.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a new vulnerability of CDNs, redirection hijacking, which stems
from the dynamic characteristics of DNS records used for the CDN’s request routing. In a
redirection hijacking attack, adversaries can easily maneuver the CDN’s mappings between
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end users and edge servers by injecting crafted but legitimate DNS records. We reveal
that DNSSEC is ine↵ective to address such a hijacking attack, even with the new ECDSA-
based signatures that are capable of achieving live signing for dynamically generated DNS
records. This is mainly due to the reusability of signed legitimate records, which can
be exploited by adversaries to override CDN’s surrogate assignment and redirect client
requests to inappropriate edge servers. We assess the magnitude of this vulnerability
in the wild by characterizing the operations of the request routing for popular CDN
vendors and analyzing the threats via multiple case studies. We quantify the practical
impacts of redirection hijacking, especially on performance, and present more serious
threats that could nullify CDN’s load balancing and DoS protection. Finally, we discuss
the countermeasures against redirection hijacking in CDNs from di↵erent aspects.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize the studies presented in this dissertation and discuss the
future work. The naming system is one of the most critical components of the Internet,
directing how can the Internet resources be addressed and accessed. It also provides one
of the most fundamental trust anchors, and its authenticity and integrity is implicitly
assumed by not only the end users but also the important Internet services that rely on
the name resolution, such as web, email, even other critical infrastructures like CDNs.
This dissertation focuses on the di↵erent aspects of emerging trends of the Domain
Name System and how these evolutions impact the Internet infrastructure and services.
We shed light on the characteristics of di↵erent deployment patterns for modern web
services, propose and validate the simple policies to improve the e↵ectiveness of DNS
caching against the prevalent misuse of domain names, and explore the understudied
fundamental vulnerability caused by the dynamics of DNS mapping in CDNs, which also
restrains the adoption of DNSSEC to secure the integrity of those frequently changed DNS
records by signatures.
5.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions
In our first study, we performed a large-scale measurement study to profile the deployment
of authoritative DNS servers (ADNSes). We designed a heuristic method to determine
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the ADNS patterns, including private, third-party, and hybrid deployment, for a large set
of top domains. We then characterized the features for di↵erent patterns, such as perfor-
mance, stability, and availability. In addition, we also studied how the cloud-hosting web
services deploy their ADNSes. We collected the subdomains in Amazon’s cloud platforms,
and profiled the usage for di↵erent types of authoritative records, such as the private
servers inside or outside the cloud, the third-party DNS-hosting services provided by the
cloud itself or external providers.
In our second work, we studied a prevalent class of DNS misuse, the “one-time-used”
(a.k.a., disposable) domains in DNS queries. Our key insight is that if those “one-time-
used” names that are highly unlikely to be accessed in cache could be easily identified
and proactively eliminated, the cache performance could be significantly improved. We
investigated and proposed the explicitly available features from domain name itself (i.e.,
1. length of query name; 2. length of the longest subdomain name; 3. subdomain depth;
4. number of format fields) to identify the disposability of domain names. We employed
a machine learning based approach to build a classifier and combine the studied features.
We tested our approach with actual datasets captured at two campus networks, and the
results demonstrate that those simple features are able to e↵ectively reject the useless
entries (more than 85%), while minimizing the negative impact on the reusable entries
(less than 1%).
In our third work, we empirically investigated a fundamental vulnerability of CDNs,
called redirection hijacking, which stems from the dynamic mapping of DNS records used
for CDN’s request routing. Due to the dynamic characteristics of DNS mappings (i.e.,
assigning a close-by edge server for each request), the pre-computed DNSSEC signatures
cannot be deployed to secure those records in CDNs. We further illustrated that even
considering the newly adopted ECDSA-based signatures that can achieve live-signing for
DNSSEC, it is still vulnerable to a form of replay attacks when adversaries deliberately
tamper with the resolvers by injecting crafted but legitimate records associated with sub-
optimal or non-responsive edge servers, resulting in significant performance degradation
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even service interruption, while remaining undetectable by DNSSEC. We assessed the
magnitude of this vulnerability in the wild by characterizing the operations of the request
routing for popular CDN vendors and analyzing the threats via detailed case studies. We
then presented in-depth discussions on the practical countermeasures against this security
issue.
5.2 Future Work
For the future work, there are several interesting directions for extending this dissertation
research:
• DNS measurement: Complementary to our first study, we may further investigate
the usage of spam ADNSes, profile the deployment patterns of TLDs, study the
impact of (multiple) CDNs and DNSSEC on di↵erent ADNS deployment patterns,
and examine more details for cloud-hosting ADNSes. Furthermore, we may perform
comprehensive characterization on the dynamics of domain names to investigate the
abuse of domain names and how the DNS impacts and facilitates the new threats
and attacks on the Internet.
• Anycast Characterization: Anycast routing has been widely used in DNS and
CDN infrastructures. The most common method to characterize anycast is ac-
tive measurement, e.g., by using the latency detection of speed-of-light violations.
Instead of leveraging probing-based measurement to identify anycast address, we
intend to use existing BGP datasets to extract anycast addresses, which gives us
ability to (1) illustrate the anycast usage in global routing, (2) a longitudinal study
since we can leverage the archived data, and (3) study the usage of IPv6 address
space.
• CDN Vulnerabilities: Another potential problem we aim to explore is the “resid-
ual resolution” problem in CDNs, by which a CDN platform providing the Dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) protection may expose the origin IP address when
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its customers close the service and/or switch to other platforms, resulting in the fail-
ure of protection from future DDoS protection providers.
• Routing Security: We would also like to extend our studies to the security issues of
Internet routing systems. For example, the Flow Specification [93] has been deployed
in major ISPs to provide security rules in global BGP routing infrastructures but
remains understudied on its interaction with CDNs.
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